Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-92-172 *3 September 1992*

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

NOTICE TO READERS: Reportage on the 10th Nonaligned Movement Summit, held in Jakarta, Indonesia from 1-6 September, will be published in a series of special East Asia DAILY REPORT supplements.

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Bosnia-Hercegovina

TANJUG reports that Muhamed Secerbegovic, ambassador to the United Nations, told journalists that the Muslims "signed no obligation in London on putting its own heavy weaponry under U.N. supervision because it does not possess such weapons in larger quantities."

Stjepan Kljujic, a member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, said at a press conference that "there can be no negotiations with Radovan Karadzic and the Serb Democratic Party," TANJUG reports. He added: "I will be among those who will demand a fight to the end because I am convinced that the peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina deserve to be rid of this evil once and for all."

Bulgaria

Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov described "reports on tips about ongoing preparations for a coup d'etat received yesterday at the editorial offices of several Sofia dailies," as "a new attempt to create chaos and exert pressure," BTA reports. Colonel General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Army General Staff, stated: "I believe that the spreading of such rumors is a gross political provocation and an attempt to shake the confidence of the Bulgarian people in the Army."

Czechoslovakia

Prague radio reports that the Czech Government rejected a draft bill "on the extinction of the CSFR" because of "legislative and technical faults, or, to be more precise, the unbalanced nature of the manner of the extinction and the interpretation of the article on referendum."

Poland

The Senate Constitutional Commission "sharply criticized" the Small Constitution, and "even suggested that it be rejected altogether," POLSKA ZBROJNA reports. An article detailing the procedure for forming a government "aroused the greatest controversy;" "the commission was unanimous that the procedure is too lengthy and could paralyze the functioning of the state."

Hungary

NEPSZABADSAG published "detailed excerpts" from a controversial article by Istvan Csurka, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) deputy chairman. In the article, Istvan criticized financial circles and stated: "The MDF should get rid of the putrid pact spirit and the servility and cowardice that always justify the enemy's half-truths." He also called for "a new MDF," declaring: "This autumn is the last chance."

Prime Minister Terms Coup Idea 'Insane'

AU0309093492 Sofia BTA in English
0901 GMT 3 Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 3 (BTA)—"A new attempt to create chaos and exert pressure," thus Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov described the rumours of a coup plot, speaking to journalists at the Council of Ministers today. "There is a paradox: On the hand, everyone voices concern over mounting pressure, and on the other hand, many people seem to be 'bickering' only to build up pressure," Mr. Dimitrov said shortly before the regular cabinet meeting today.

He described as "insane" the idea of a coup d'etat staged by people in power. Rumours of the alleged plot reached many institutions, including the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army. A subsequent inquiry proved them groundless. This prompted the statement of Colonel General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the General Staff, on Channel One of national television last night.

Army Chief of Staff Denies Coup 'Rumors'

AU0209184492 Sofia BTA in English
1837 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 2 (BTA)—This evening the chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, Colonel-General Lyuben Petrov, categorically denied what he called "rumors" about the preparation of a military coup in Bulgaria. I believe that the spreading of such rumors is a gross political provocation and an attempt to shake the confidence of the Bulgarian people in the Army, Colonel-General Lyuben Petrov said.

General Lyuben Petrov said that the Bulgarian Army is called upon to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bulgaria. As a national, non-partisan and state institution, the Bulgarian Army is not taking and will not take part in any political struggles whatsoever, he stressed. According to the chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, any attempts to involve the Army in the settlement of political disputes will be resolutely countered as incompatible with the Bulgarian Constitution and the Act on the Depoliticization of the Army.

The Bulgarian Army is for civil peace and stability. Colonel-General Lyuben Petrov said. It stands firmly behind the Constitution and the legally elected state bodies.

In connection with some reports about rising tension in the Army following a recent order by Defence Minister Aleksandur Staliyski not recognizing one category of officers as holders of higher education, the general announced that Mr. Staliyski has canceled this order. The general hopes that this would ease the tension.

Papers Report Rumors of Coup Plan Against Zhelev

AU0309083592 Sofia BTA in English
0746 GMT 3 Sep 92

[From BTA review of Sofia press on 3 September]

[Text] Sofia, September 3 (BTA) - Under a headline "Coup Rumours Spread in Sofia—Official Institutions Rule Out Possibility," KONTINENT frontpages reports on tips about ongoing preparations for a coup d'etat received yesterday at the editorial offices of several Sofia dailies. An unnamed source claimed that the coup was planned for Saturday [5 September] and Sunday, when the president will be absent from the country, KONTINENT writes. According to DUMA, the action is planned by anti-presidential forces, including one deputy prime minister.

PODKREPA runs a report on the alleged plot headlined "SDS Extremists Plot To Topple President. Chaos, Plan and Dismissal of High-Ranking Military Should Help Plot Succeed." Quoting an anonymous source, TRUD runs an alleged statement by Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov: "I am running this state. I toppled ex-Defence Minister Dimitur Ludzhev, president's foreign policy advisor Zdravko Popov; when Zhelev also leaves office, I would not mind resigning." According to another report in PODKREPA, tank brigades are ready to head for Sofia. PODKREPA writes that, according to a DUMA journalist there were attempts to recruit the support of Vice-President Mrs. Blaga Dimitrova. A Defence Ministry spokesman denied these allegations.

Trade Union Leader Calls For Cabinet Changes

AU0209143592 Sofia BTA in English
1406 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 2 (BTA)—The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (KNSB), one of the two most influential trade unions in this country, believes the political situation has changed and the differences between the cabinet and the trade unions have assumed large proportions, turning into a conflict between the executive and all the rest. At a news conference today KNSB President Prof. Krustyu Petkov said this, calling for a "complete cabinet overhaul" or for a new cabinet.

The trade unions will not take actions against the cabinet headed by Filip Dimitrov, Mr. Petkov said. The decisive set-to will be in parliament and the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms will have the final say, Prof. Petkov predicted. The movement's leader Ahmed Dogan yesterday made a similar statement.

The KNSB president believes that unless the cabinet is overhauled within three weeks, or unless a new cabinet is formed by the end of October, a parliamentary crisis and new elections can be expected in November.

The KNSB leader assessed positively the position of President Zhelyu Zhelev, which, according to the trade union leadership, sums up the actual social and economic situation. It can no longer be argued that only the trade unions are putting up opposition to the cabinet, Prof. Petkov said.

The KNSB and the Podkrepa Labour Confederation cannot be set against each other, Mr. Petkov said, adding that the local branches of the two trade unions are acting jointly as the situation requires. He predicted a rise in trade union activity among miners, teachers and health care workers. The same view was expressed yesterday by Dr. Trenchev, president of the other influential trade union—the Podkrepa Labour Confederation.

The KNSB has prepared a memorandum containing criticism and an alternative to the cabinet's macroeconomic policy, it became known at the news conference. Prof. Petkov said it will be submitted later on, either to the present cabinet or to a new one.

SDS Government's Chances of 'Survival' Assessed

AU0309092892 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 29-30 Aug 92 p 6

[Ruen Krumov article: "Options for the Survival of the Union of Democratic Forces and Its Government"]

[Text] Even the most unprejudiced political observers, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] Coordinating Council included, already realize that the second Filip Dimitrov government cannot be expected to last much longer in its present form. This is the logical result of the government's current policy of total confrontation in relations with everyone: with the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], with the so-called "rejects" [lyuspi]—namely, parties and movements who were among the SDS founders, and last but not least, with the trade unions, especially with Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation and his "entourage," who are accused of all sorts of sins. The already rather strained relations with the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] parliamentary group should be added to this. The DPS, with its 24 members of parliament, plays the role of a balancing force in parliament and has the power to provoke a crisis at any time—whenever it chooses to do so. DPS leader Ahmed Dogan has already demanded the heads of Finance Minister Ivan Kostov and government adviser Konstantin Mishev, called the "champion of intrigue." For the first time, Mr. Dogan has set a specific time limit—namely, that the cabinet, in its present form, should not outlast the month of September 1992.

Nevertheless, all this should not mean that the SDS has lost all chances of further ruling the country. The more so since recent public opinion polls confirm that the SDS can still rely on the hard core of its electorate. These radical right-wing voters continue to believe (whether they are right or wrong is another question) that the SDS is the real champion of democracy and the only political force capable of accomplishing the process of "decommunization." The BSP is losing its chances as a result of its increasingly hard-line policy and its failure to turn into a social democratic party. It cannot be considered a real alternative for the SDS. The disunited center is hardly likely to provide a genuine alternative, especially because of the split within the agrarian forces.

There are at least three possible options for a temporary survival of the SDS government.

The first and easiest alternative is for Filip Dimitrov to make some cosmetic changes in his cabinet, trying to preserve his finance minister. This option could only have a temporary effect. The third Filip Dimitrov cabinet is hardly likely to last long, since everyone—the SDS hawks, the DPS, and the trade unions alike—would be dissatisfied with it.

The second option would be a government composed of SDS hard-liners, led by people such as Georgi Markov, Verzhiniya Velcheva, and Ventseslav Dimitrov, and even Stefan Savov, who realized that his position in parliament was painfully shaken. Such an option is likely to cause a further discarding of "rejects" [lyuspi] from the SDS ranks, which would result in a further narrowing of the SDS foundation. This alternative would be possible only if its initiators had recourse to exceptional measures, but whether they have the strength to do so is very uncertain. This option is hardly likely to be successful in the long run because both the DPS and the trade unions would oppose it.

The third option would be the result of an alliance between the Center for New Policy, headed by Dimitur Ludzhev, the Podkrepa Labor Confederation and its lobby in parliament (in which the ASP [Alternative Social Liberal Party] and Stoyan Ganev's United Democratic Center, in part, are playing the chief role), and the DPS. This third alternative SDS government would probably try to promote a pseudo-social welfare program through which it would hope to win the support of the trade unions. It is common knowledge that the greatest shortcoming of the two Filip Dimitrov cabinets was the excessively high price they forced the Bulgarian people to pay for the transition from a planned economy to a market economy while 2-3 percent of the population got rich. Hence, the third option for government is likely to emphasize this aspect. Nevertheless, considering that the National Assembly has already voted on the restitution laws, thus depriving the majority of the people of privatization share vouchers, the chances for this cabinet would not be very substantial.

Nevertheless, of the three possible alternatives, this one has the greatest chance of longer survival as long as it has not exhausted its possibilities. In that case, parliamentary elections ahead of schedule will be the only solution. Nevertheless, the aforementioned type of government would mean an even closer alliance with Turkish-U.S. policy for our country. It is true that the Center of New

Policy is strongly opposed by the present SDS leadership. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the "swamp" [blatoto] of the SDS parliamentary group will easily change its mind after its sees from which side the wind is blowing, especially if this government is likely to win President Zhelev's support, who, despite the pressure of the SDS "hawks," persists in his efforts devoted to nationwide consensus and to the unification of all democratic forces.

The SDS National Conference, which was postponed to 18-19 September is expected to throw more light on the question of which of the three aforementioned alternatives of survival is likely to prevail.

Turkish Minister Interviewed on Cooperation

AU0209114592 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Kalina Stancheva report]

[Excerpts] The 11th Session of the Bulgarian-Turkish Intergovernmental Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation opened at the Boyana Residence this morning. The plenary session opened with extensive statements by Aleksandur Aleksandrov and Orhan Kilercioglu, the two cochairmen of the committee. [passage omitted]

Mr. Orhan Kilercioglu is a Turkish minister of state and his duties include the subject of refugees and their problems. He is also director general of the board in charge of foreign economic relations. The statement which he made for the Khorizont Radio Network contains references to these subjects.

[Begin Kilercioglu recording, in Turkish, fading into Bulgarian translation] The 11th session of the Turkish-Bulgarian Intergovernmental Committee is pursuing the fundamental objective of implementing the economic programs agreed upon between our two countries and of mapping out more stable and long-term prospects for them. Relations between Bulgaria and Turkey are improving from day to day, which we consider very important. I am convinced that, in view of the present-day situation in the Balkans, Bulgarian-Turkish relations are reaching a peak, which is likely to exert a beneficial influence beyond our two states. I think that such relations serve the interests of peace and security, and peace is in the interest of the whole region. [end recording]

Kilercioglu added that new guidelines should be mapped out for the economic relations between the two countries and that they should be also at the level of political relations. Economic relations should not lag behind, he said.

This view will certainly be even more strongly confirmed during our talks and the subject of the 1989 emigrants from Bulgaria to Turkey will also be discussed. These emigrants are Turkish citizens today, Mr. Kilercioglu pointed out. I think that your country's National Assembly adopted very positive decisions, which the Turkish Republic's Government highly appreciates. We now intend to discuss some of their aspects. I repeat it is our wish further to expand our relations with Bulgaria in the future.

For the Bulgarian side, Minister Aleksandur Aleksandrov, the cochairman of the Intergovernmental Committee, was also well prepared for the fruitful and businesslike atmosphere of the talks. The agreement signed between Bulgaria and Turkey on 6 May 1992 was at the time defined as an open structure. Which part of its necessary economic substance will be treated on a priority basis at the present session of the committee? This is what I asked Mr. Aleksandrov to explain.

[Begin Aleksandrov recording] The working groups and commissions which are in charge of negotiations in the coming days will discuss certain subjects of crucial importance, such as the possibilities of increasing the exchange of goods, namely the trade exchange, which has recently showed positive increases, but we are convinced that there are still a number of other opportunities in this respect.

In the context of talks on the exchange of goods, we will also discuss several topics connected with the exchange of technologies and with facilitating direct links in the industrial sector. We will conduct separate discussions on facilitating conditions in the field of transportation.

I hope that the negotiations about signing an agreement on avoiding double taxation will also be treated on a priority basis during our talks. I am convinced that both sides need an updating of customs agreements. I think that there is good will on both sides concerning these issues, so that they may be put forward at the negotiating table over the coming three days and that they may be discussed and dealt with. We hope that the experts will have the opportunity to exchange wide-ranging opinions on these matters and that we may specify deadlines for their implementation, hopefully by the end of the year. I am also confident that we will find an appropriate solution to each of the problems discussed [end recording]. [passage omitted]

Czech Government Rejects Bill on CSFR Extinction

LD0209163392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] A short while ago correspondent Milan Cervenka attended a news conference held after the Czech Government ended its meeting:

[Cervenka] From the content of today's discussion, it is necessary above all to single out the draft of the constitutional bill on the extinction of the CSFR and the draft principles of the Czech National Council bill on the Czech state treasury. The draft bill on the extinction was not recommended. The reason: legislative and technical faults, or, to be more precise, the unbalanced nature of the manner of the extinction and the interpretation of the article on referendum.

In contrast, by today's deliberations the state treasury of the Czech Republic has acquired a basis for its future activity. However, it will be necessary to amplify, for instance, its relationship with the State Fund.

Another important item on today's agenda was the appointment of the preparatory committee which is to establish an economic chamber. According to Karel Dyba, minister for economic policy and development, a 25-member committee was approved. It is composed of 15 members drawn from business associations and ten members proposed by Minister Dyba.

The government also examined a proposal to appoint judges of the Supreme Court of the CSFR. It recommended Dr. Kase and Dr. Vesely but the proposal to appoint Dr. Rychetsky failed to get through. The reason: Vice Premier Jan Kalvoda said at the press conference that the matter was decided by the vote taken by the government members. He was not aware, however, of more detailed reasons and therefore could not enlarge on the matter.

The government also today recalled the head of the District Office in Sumperk from his post.

Slovak Council Approves Bill on FSIS Abolition

LD0209194392 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Excerpts] After the adoption of the government-sponsored draft of the Slovak Constitution in the Slovak parliament the government continued to work from about 2330 until 0130. It dealt with three drafts of Federal constitutional bills. [passage omitted]

The last of the three bills is the draft of the constitutional bill on amendments to some of the laws in relation to the abolition of the Federal Security and Information Service [FSIS]. The Slovak Government approved this draft of the Federal constitutional bill yesterday. The division of the FSIS assets should be finished by 31 October 1992 and the FSIS should be abolished by 30 September 1992. [passage omitted]

Hungarian Minister, Meciar Discuss Minorities

LD0209202492 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Excerpts] The Hungarian foreign minister, during his visit to Pozsony [Bratislava], proposed a bilateral treaty with his Slovak hosts. Peter Nyaradi reports.

During the afternoon of his one-day visit to Pozsony, Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky met Vladimir Meciar, Slovak head of government, with whom he reviewed the current standing of bilateral relations. [passage omitted]

Following his meeting with Vladimir Meciar, Geza Jeszenszky said that Hungary understands Slovakia's efforts toward independence, and that our homeland, as an outsider, accepts any decision made by the two neighboring peoples about their own future. After this, Geza Jeszenszky said the following:

[Begin recording] Our meetings today with Prime Minister Meciar and [Foreign] Minister Knazko were of an exploratory nature. We discussed what we will have to talk about in the coming days, weeks, months, perhaps even years. And, I think it is not surprising or a new factor that we will have to talk about many things still, not necessarily because we do not agree on every question, but because we see great possibilities, precisely with Slovakia, which has stepped onto the road of independence, for bilateral relations to be made more profound in every respect.

So, we see tasks in the sphere of the economy, in cooperation, in free trade, and this has priority. However, we have to resolve old questions which we have been left, like the Boes [Gabcikovo] power station. However, we talked very little about this question, so I do not think it is worth your while asking much about this.

We spoke more about the situation of minorities living in the two countries, their self-assessment, and I think further negotiations will be needed on this question. I myself have the same view as Prime Minister Meciar, that Slovakia's citizens first and foremost—Slovaks, Hungarians, and other minorities—must reach an understanding on the form, forms, and frameworks of coexistence. And, Hungary would be very pleased if it could offer congratulations on an understanding reached in such a way. [end recording]

Vladimir Meciar pointed out that he considers the visit of the Hungarian foreign minister to be very significant, as well as his own visit to Budapest next week, for this will be his first official visit following his election victory. Slovakia greatly appreciates that Hungary has shown restraint on the issue of Czech and Slovak internal relations as well as in connection with the various hints

to disturb the borders and the attempts to question the permanence of these borders.

After this, however, Vladimir Meciar said the following regarding nationalities:

[Begin recording, in Slovak, fading into Hungarian translation] Mr. Minister Jeszenszky has offered a bilateral agreement for the settling of this issue. We will obviously talk about it in Budapest, too, but the Slovak position is more than restrained on this matter. According to Meciar, first, Hungary has to show an example in the solution of the nationality issue, and only after this can the matter of Hungarians in Slovakia be dealt with.

Premier Meciar repeated that Slovakia is giving rights to the national minorities above the level of the international norms.

Regarding the Boes issue, Meciar was of the opinion that a proposal Jozsef Antall had made earlier is worth considering. The proposal said: In exchange for the cancellation of Nagymaros, let Boes be completed. [end recording]

Slovak Official Meets With EC Envoys

LD0309040292 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Slovak National Council Chairman Ivan Gasparovic received ambassadors of the EC countries in Bratislava today. They inquired mainly about the constitution of the Slovak Republic. According to Ivan Gasparovic, the ambassadors have doubts about the democratic credentials of the constitution, a view they acquired from information sources outside Slovakia. He said that he was also not surprised by their view of the position of minorities, the Hungarian position above all, in Slovakia. According to him, this is a result of activity by the Hungarian lobby in the EC organs, a lobby that is creating an unfavorable picture of Slovakia in relation to national minorities and ethnic groups. The ambassadors assured Ivan Gasparovic that in no case did they adopt a negative stance on the emergence of two independent states.

Slovak Authorities 'Ban' Human Rights Group Rally

AU0209203192 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 31 Aug 92 p 2

["ams"-signed report: "Human Movement on Human Rights"]

[Text] Banska Bystrica—Immediately after the official part of celebrations for the 48th anniversary of the Slovak national uprising, a citizens' rally was to be held on the premises of the Slovak national uprising memorial in Banska Bystrica. The invitation to it was issued by the Human Movement, under the symbolic slogan: "At the eleventh hour." The rally had to take place at a different place than originally planned. As the organizers revealed, this became necessary after the City Office issued a ban.

The rally was attended by representatives of Charter 77, the Helsinki Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, and other initiatives, including minority initiatives. The idea of emancipation ran like a scarlet thread through the informal debate. At present, the idea of national emancipation is manifesting itself in particular, although the rights of citizens were violated during the era of totalitarianism. Unfortunately, contemporary politicians give priority to national emancipation over the emancipation of citizens' rights. The Slovak national uprising was, first and foremost, a struggle for emancipation of the citizen from the rule of the "Uebermenschen." At the same time, it bequeathed to us the strengthening, rather than the destruction, of the common state. That is what the heroes of the Slovak National Council were fighting and dying for.

Representatives of the Helsinki Committee stressed that attempts to trample citizens' rights underfoot are beginning to make themselves felt in Slovakia once again. The Helsinki Committee will come out against this vigorously. The complete passage [priechod] of information flows will be important in this regard.

In an appeal, the participants stated that the victorious political movements no longer lean on the people, but go against the people, particularly when they prevent them from exercising the basic right to say in what kind of a state they want to live. Therefore, they call upon various civic initiatives to establish a network of social activities to defend the basic rights of citizens.

Federal Cabinet Approves Power-Sharing Arrangement

LD0309091692 Prague CSTK in English 0737 GMT 3 Sep 92

[Text] Prague Sept 3 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak cabinet last night approved amendments to the 1968 law on the Czechoslovak Federation, newly defining the powers of the federation, the Czech and the Slovak Republics.

In accordance with the Czechoslovak Government programme, the amended bill transfers powers which need not be exercised by federal bodies to the two republics.

The bill specifies the powers the republics are themselves able to exercise, without upsetting the foundations of the federal state and causing negative effects in the economy, the social and administrative areas and in the sphere of fundamental rights and freedoms.

The bill proposes a significant reduction of the number and size of the bodies of central state administration, and the shifting of the powers of the abolished and reduced bodies of central administration to the republics.

The cabinet approved principles of granting licences for the arms trade, which substantially simplifies the process of approval of arms deals that existed so far, at the same time ensuring the defence of the foreign policy, security and economic interests of Czechoslovakia.

A licence for trade in military material may be granted provided the realisation of the deal does not run counter to Czechoslovakia's international commitments and its foreign policy and security interests.

Contradictory cases will be decided by the Czechoslovak Government or the State Defence Council.

Exports of weapons will not be permitted to countries, on which embargoes were imposed by U.N. Security Council resolutions or which are subject to restrictions arising from Czechoslovakia's other international legal commitments.

The cabinet dismissed Vojtech Wagner from the post of Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister and named Jaroslav Suchanek first deputy foreign minister.

Problems in Arms Industry Reviewed

AU2608164292 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Aug 92 p 7

[Josef Tucek article: "An Injection of Funds for the Arms Industry"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak arms industry—so strong in the past that the country ranked seventh worldwide in arms exports—has fallen on hard times. So hard that the industry should receive another injection of funds to survive. The Federal Government will consider it, probably in September.

"Above all, state assistance is involved here, while facilities for the production of ammunition and guided anti-tank missiles should be preserved," says Josef Fucik of the Federal Economy Ministry. "The state will not provide a single koruna from its budget, however. The Army should be able to find the necessary funds and buy some ammunition even this year."

If the Federal Government approves this idea, it will make the life of the Army commanders much more complicated. They have been complaining for a long time that they do not have funds for larger purchases. Nevertheless, it would not be for the first time since November 1989 that the state has helped the arms enterprises. For instance, in 1990 the Calfa government agreed to allow Heavy Machine Tool Enterprises in Martin to manufacture 82 tanks over and above the scheduled quantity (the original plan was 25 tanks) and most of the production was bought by the Army. At that time, the threat of unemployment in the weapons factories was the reason. Now the reason is to save the production facilities from bankruptcy.

Ammunition (of Soviet type for weapons of Soviet origin) is manufactured mainly in the General Engineering Plants in Dubnica and Vahom. This is, however, the final link in the chain which includes, for instance, Adamovske Engineering Plants, or Synthesia Semtin. Should production in Czechoslovakia be discontinued, the Army would become dependent either on purchases in successor states of the former Soviet Union or in Bulgaria. This is what the military would like to avoid. In Dubnica nad Vahom they drafted projects for modernization of their dangerous products. If they survive—they say—their artillery ammunition will soon catch up with the international standard, that is, its range will improve, it will be equipped with rocket engines, and it will be guided at the target even after being launched, etc.

Tanks Without a Future

It is mainly the Slovak arms manufacturers whose existence is in question as their Czech colleagues are slightly better off.

The international community is subconsciously familiar with the Czechoslovak arms industry, mainly due to the T-72 tanks, which we are now exporting to Syria. Their final manufacturer is the Heavy Machine Tool Enterprises in Martin. Experts have doubts, however, about the future of further production. The tanks would need new armor, their firing control system and night vision should be improved, etc. Otherwise, they will not beat the competition. Our arms factories, however, do not have the funds for this kind of research and development. The idea that orders by the Czechoslovak Army could save the industry is equally erroneous. The Army is reducing, according to international treaties, the number of its tanks to 1,435 units (from the original 4,585). In the near future, the military only expects that their present inventory of tanks will be improved in the near future. This process involves dismantling the old unit and inserting a new engine, barrel, and better equipment in the armored shell. This is substantially cheaper than buying a completely new machine and the Army can perform this process in their repair facilities.

Experts foresee a similar situation in armored vehicles. They are manufactured in Heavy Machine Tool Enterprises Plants in Dubnica and Vahom. There are also question marks hanging over the manufacture of cannons. In Dubnica nad Vahom they are developing, instead of the old DANA howitzer, its new model whose caliber should meet the NATO standards. Its future is also uncertain for the time being, however.

Prospering Arms Factories

The Aero Vodochody is doing quite well so far. This enterprise has manufactured (and exported many of them) 2,800 Albatros aircraft. This aircraft will be manufactured now with a stronger engine, modern electronics—American electronics in particular but also Israeli electronics—and other innovations. The Albatros is a

training aircraft, but it can be equipped with weapons. For example, Iraq used it to carry bombs containing poisonous material. The price of the Albatros is only one-third of similar Western machines, so quite a bright future can be expected for Aero. All in all, they already have contracts to sell about 100 of these machines to Western customers. It seems that the company is able to find customers in the civilized world, and not just in crisis areas.

The Uhersky Brod Arms Factory is potentially another prosperous enterprise. The newly-developed line of LADA hand weapons promises to be successful. They are submachine guns available with a butt and without. These weapons were manufactured with a 5.45 millimeter caliber (according to Warsaw Pact standards) and are now being made with the 5.56 millimeter caliber used by NATO. This delayed their production, however, which will not begin until 1994. The LADA weapons are considered to be of the highest standard, so success in foreign markets is expected.

Declining Exports

For the arms industry of a small country, it is impossible to exist only on the needs of the domestic force. It would be unacceptably expensive. Weapons manufacturers survive only if they export. Of course, it would be ideal from the viewpoint of international politics if exports were not directed toward the crisis areas.

Exports from our country are lagging, however. According to official data, 5.1 billion korunas worth of weaponry were exported last year, substantially less than the sales of 22.7 billion korunas in 1987. Moreover, these data are given in the prices of the relevant year. Taking inflation into account, the decline in the volume of exports will be even greater. It is then possible to expect more pressure by weapons manufacturers—warning of the threat of higher unemployment—in demanding new export licenses for the politically and militarily unstable countries which would still buy our weapons. The Federal Government has yielded to this pressure several times (such as the highly controversial tank deals with Syria). The question is whether the Slovak Government will be even more willing to meet them halfway if the federation is partitioned. This would develop some prospects for the heavy weapons industry. In the light of competition from advanced weapons manufacturers in the West—but also arm dealers from Russia (who sell our T-72 tanks even cheaper than we do) observers do not expect these prospects to last more than a few years, however.

Statistical Offices Cite Cost of Living Figures

AU2908181692 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Aug 92 p 8

[Federal Statistical Office, Czech Statistical Office, and Slovak Statistical Office report: "The Development of Consumer Prices and the Cost of Living in July"]

[Text] Consumer prices rose 0.8 percent in July as compared with June. This increase includes, in particular, a 5 percent increase in prices for services and a 0.5 percent increase in public catering. Prices for food products rose slightly—0.1 percent, and prices for nonfood products remained the same as last month.

A more pronounced increase in prices for services was affected by a 24.4 percent increase in rent for state-owned apartments, and a 26.2 percent increase in prices for bus transportation (40.5 percent in the Czech Republic alone). In public catering, prices rose 1.2 percent, particularly for beverages served in restaurants. In food products, prices rose more sharply for both alcohol-free and alcoholic beverages—1 percent, and prices for fats, meat, and meat products fell slightly—0.5 percent. In the case of nonfood products, prices for the majority of goods moved slightly in both directions.

Compared with December 1991, from the beginning of the year to July, consumer prices rose 3.9 percent. The most pronounced increase was recorded in prices for services—9.3 percent, public catering—6.4 percent, and nonfood products—3 percent; the smallest increase was recorded in prices for food products—1.4 percent. In the Czech Republic, prices rose faster than in the Slovak Republic—3.2 percent in general (particularly for services and food products).

In comparison with the same period last year, consumer prices in July were generally 6.9 percent higher in the CSFR, 7.7 percent in the Czech Republic, and 5.4 percent in the Slovak Republic.

The average annual increase in consumer prices (the average over the last 12 months against the average of the 12 preceding months) was 25.2 percent in the CSFR, 24.7 percent in the Czech Republic, and 26.6 percent in the Slovak Republic.

The cost of living in July rose in employees' and pensioners' households by 1 percent, and in farmers' households by 0.5 percent.

From the beginning of the year to July (compared with December 1991), there was roughly the same increase in the cost of living in pensioners' and farmers' households—3 percent, and 4 percent in employees' households. The cost of living increased faster in the Czech Republic than in the Slovak Republic in all groups of households.

'Excerpts' of Csurka Document Published

AU0209100192 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Aug 92 p 6

["Excerpts" from article by Istvan Csurka, Hungarian Democratic Forum deputy chairman, originally published in MAGYAR FORUM on 20 August: "Excerpts From Csurka's Theses"]

[Text] The article by Istvan Csurka published in MAGYAR FORUM on 20 August has provoked a passionate debate among people interested in politics. We have also received several articles by people who take issue with Csurka's statements, and in the coming days we will publish some of them. In order to inform our readers, we are publishing here detailed excerpts of the original document.

Today, Central Europe needs a type of adaptability in both politics and everyday life that is unprecedented here and elsewhere in the world. This adaptability must be rapid and immediate; thus, improvisation is a way of life here.

Naturally, the coefficient for error is rather high.

Perhaps one of the biggest mistakes in the history of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the government is that they failed to reveal this fact and our state of isolation, helplessness, and self-reliance. The MDF failed to make it clear that we can only make the transition from the stinky ravines of gulash-communism to the peaks of a new free and independent life though extreme mutual effort.

The last reform-communist government in Hungary, which was also at the mercy of its own banking system during the disintegrating years of the Kadar regime and the period of living on credits from abroad, essentially determined the depth of change in the regime, if such a change is taking place at all.

Although the IMF's budget stipulations and demands for economic restructuring demands did not include political requirements in so many words, they nevertheless did contain hidden requirements because a society and an economy cannot be restructured with disregard for the intentions of the financing bodies.

Thus, for the Hungarian financial sphere, the change of regime meant a carefree marking of time, smoothness, and the preservation of all influences, as well as a good view of the processes, the preservation and development of good relations with Western capital, the facilitation of the comrades' survival, and the continued hiding of things that need to be hidden.

A similar process took place in 1945 and 1946, when the Interior Ministry and police—namely, the only force at the time capable of dismantling democracy—were taken away from the Smallholders' Party, which won the elections. The Hungarian banking system and finances, 45 years later, were as important as the police was at that time, when control over the police guaranteed the power elite and the nomenklatura of the Kadar era the same conditions as the political police had done in the past. The communist henchmen, murderers, and torturers were supported by Voroshilov's Allied Control Committee and the occupying Red Army at that time; today, the financial elite of the restructuring era is supported by the IMF....

On the Accusation of Anti-Semitism

Accusations of anti-Semitism have haunted the MDF from the very beginning. The government itself is also continually forced to defend itself against this accusation.

It is not the democratic opposition that found out that there are anti-Semites in the MDF; the opposition only inherited this accusation from the activists of [Communist ideologue Gyorgy] Aczel's agitation and propaganda machinery.

Let us review the post-1945 events. A considerable number of the returning Hungarian Jewry, which was terribly decimated after the German occupation, saw the Communist Party as the only guarantee for a renewed life and the only guarantee that a situation like 1944 would never be repeated. This was not just because every member of the Moscow-led Hungarian communist quartet was Jewish, but even more because the domestic left-wing communist residue also enjoyed financial support from the formal liberal bourgeois Jewry....

After all, Hungarian Jewry's sense of homeland was greater than ever during the Kadar regime.... In this sick and obsolescent period, Budapest and Vienna were the two metropolitan cities where Jews exercised an open or hidden influence and where they could be a determining factor.

Both the Aczel-type liberals of the former Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] and the democratic opposition that had close contacts with the MSZMP liberals saw this hegemony as threatened by the emergence of the MDF. An organization in which these people have no delegates to immediately signal any step that might threaten the hegemonic position of Hungarian Jewry is a dangerous organization. Thus, both the MSZMP and the democratic opposition saw the MDF as the primary danger. The fact that an article describing the MDF's anti-Semitism was published in New York just one day after Lakitelek [the opposition meeting prior to the fall of the communist regime]—actually a warning—was possible not only because of the good relations and rapid reaction of the democratic opposition. It also required cooperation with the banking contacts of the time, the consulate, and the secret lines that had been developed long before that.

The Real Reason Behind the Pact

It was already clear to the well-informed that we are actually talking about a struggle between two sides: a national center, which has both a Christian wing and a national and former Smallholders socialist trend, and a leftist bloc, which is unmatched in its anticommunist radicalism, but which has been trying to preserve the rule that has been continuous since 1945. Naturally, this includes guarantees of Jewish influence, but preserving financial positions and perpetuating power is the most important endeavor....

When, after the results of the second round of general elections, [Prime Minister Jozsef] Antall announced that he would form a coalition with the Smallholders' Party and the Christian Democratic Party, leaving both the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Federation of Young Democrats out, the amount of savings at the Hungarian National Bank dropped by half in one week.

Overnight, Hungary found itself on the brink of bankruptcy. The state and big banks, which had some $1.5 billion in the Hungarian National Bank as a token of trust, suddenly thought their money was not in a good place....

All this must have been directed, or at least inspired from somewhere, for some reason....

The negotiations between the MDF and the SZDSZ that were already going on became active, and by the time a government was formed, one of the most controversial and most damaging agreements in the history of Hungarian politics was drawn up. It was an agreement that interfered with the life of Hungarian society precisely at a time when there was a great need for the "upper echelons" simply to accept and carry out the wishes of the people expressed in free elections.

A lot has been said about this pact, but most of it is superficial. First, it has never yet been presented as a forced political retreat that resulted from an $800 million bludgeon after several attempts at penetration had been avoided....

In this pact, the MDF gave away a considerable part of its practical power to a narrow circle of people whom it had defeated and with whom it had been able to avoid any alliance at the roundtable talks. One can see the extent of the practical power involved here and the depth and manner of the change in regime from [Hungarian President] Arpad Goncz's refusal to sign documents, the advantages gained by the former nomenklatura in the course of privatization, and the communist infection of certain bodies....

Arbitrarily exceeding his power, in his position as Army commander in chief, Goncz blocked the attempt by the Army's transport vehicles and cranes to free the Danube bridges in Budapest from the vehicles of taxi drivers and those attempting to overthrow the government....

Goncz refused to allow this because those who stood behind him, the communists, the reform-communists, the liberal and radical nomenklatura, and the connections in Paris, New York, and Tel Aviv ordered him not to....

Today's so-called liberals and those who generally call themselves leftists would like to maintain today's freedom, openness, and democracy at the level of democracy that prevailed in 1945 when, because of a few German-led Nyilas-party scoundrels [Hungarian Nazis], the entire right-wing oriented Hungarian intelligentsia, the truly democratic middle class, and the members of national and historical orientation in Hungarian society could simply be branded as "rightists" and "reactionaries" and, irrespective of the results of elections, power could be abused. That is why the concept of a "Christian course" is present in public opinion and why the most reactionary Romanian use of the term "Horthyist fascism" is still in use. This is where they want to draw the line. However, a really independent national restructuring should base itself for the future on all of its own history and should draw lessons from it. A group of people constantly mumbling their oft repeated Marxist theories while, in fact, longing for power should not stand in the way of a feeling of national continuity and self-identification, a group that seeks to consign one period in Hungarian history to oblivion, while creating hundreds of cabaret songs about another period that they see as pointing toward themselves. It is not true that everything that happened before 1867, before the great emigration from Galicia, was "romantic" while the forgettable history of another "not yet real" nation is not "romantic." On the contrary! All of it is important, down the line to [King] Arpad and beyond, because we became what we are now together with the Cumanians, the Slovaks, the Romanians, the Saxons, the Swabians, and the Jews, and we can only build our future, our independence, and our survival on this....

We Should Not Be Afraid of Breaking Away

Thus, breaking away means totally breaking with pact-readiness [paktumpapucssag], softness, gullibility, and breaking with the constant mournful retreat. We can no longer remain silent....

Therefore, the MDF should get rid of the putrid pact spirit and the servility and cowardice that always justify the enemy's half-truths.

What are we afraid of? We will be annihilated even if we do not break out. Where in the world is there an authority today that, after the death camps and child murders in Serbia, could justifiably interfere in Hungarian domestic affairs because it disapproves of the government's firm steps?

We must no longer wait for applause from abroad because, prompted by the old banking connections, some foreign countries today applaud precisely helplessness and half-heartedness and regard highway robbery as democratic and market economy orientation....

The new program should be based on strong pillars. The leading MDF bodies should essentially agree upon these program pillars even before formulation of the final program, and should coordinate all this with the government. Then, the programs of government measures and government behavior should be immediately made public to make it clear that the government is operating on the basis of the governing party's decisions. Then, the government will begin implementing the decisions that can be implemented in the framework of the present government....

When, during the party state, we were seeking a political patron and found one in the reform wing of the MSZMP, it was only Imre Pozsgay and his circle, because it was only their narrow circle that represented Magyardom. (Matyas Szuros and his team only came to the scene later.) Others could also have become reformers, and they did, but there was a need for a certain minimum level of Magyardom for cooperation with the MDF....

A National Middle Class

Today, the national forces on both the "right" and "left" side are scattered, not only because others have successfully incited us against each other, but also because we did not have the readiness to cooperate. No one realized the great danger inherent in scattering....

We must make use of every opportunity to ease the burdens of our people. We must switch to a more just distribution of the public burden because there are people who can no longer bear their burdens. Not every property has come from venture and talent, and not every accumulation of capital is "original." (At most, it is based on an "original" idea of how to circumvent or use a law.)

We must make use of every means to fully observe our laws. Economic crimes should also be disclosed retroactively and should be severely punished. We must start breaking the power of the nomenclature; in other words, we must deny them their control over state property, and we must examine how they came into possession of their "capital." We must dissipate the erroneous belief that such severity would hinder privatization and the flow of foreign capital into Hungary. (Capital that is hindered by lawlessness would do better to stay out....)

We must make clear what kind of middle class we want: We should desire a national middle class originating from below.

We must create financial bases for this. The series of compensation laws makes a great contribution to this, but we must accelerate their implementation, and we must invent further advantages.

We do not need economic patrons prepared at the desks of the former planning office, but we need a Hungarian national economic policy. Our survival depends on this. There is nothing more sacred than the national interest. Therefore, there is no justification for fooling around with the consensus.

Consensus is the latest survival slogan of the nomenklatura. It is mortally dangerous even to refer to it.

Therefore, every idea of seeking an alliance with the nomenklatura or with the already bourgeois nomenklatura is mistaken from the outset. This is a vain hope. Such an alliance had already been made before us. In various forms, this nomenklatura has been in power since 1945. The MDF emerged against this, and not simply against the Kadar-Aczel regime, and not even against "communism." The main goal has been to put an end to this ruling continuity, which has kept changing forms and colors and spread over various regimes and eras, one that only made use of the Hungarian masses. If we make an alliance with this nomenklatura, this means a concrete denial of and desertion from the change in the regime. Breaking the nomenklatura is far from being the great task that the other side claims it is. It is enough to take a few hundred people to account and punish them strictly legally, and this looting bourgeoisie left without Soviet support will bow to us by denouncing each other.

For the MDF to be able to run in the elections, the government will have to urgently renew itself, it must drop the ballast of halfheartedness and indecision, it must cut every contact with the rearguards and the system of relations of the old regime, it must firmly smoke out inadequate and sabotaging forces from every apparatus and, without any hesitation, it must implement all the laws legislated by a parliamentary majority.

We must put things in order at the Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television without delay, and we must dismiss—if necessary, by police force—the directors and their entourage, who have been illegally appointed, and, if the president of the republic continues to oppose this measure and continues to act illegally, any administrative measure and any force will be allowed then because nothing is more illegal than his continued refusal to sign the documents.

However, if the government proves to be incapable of doing this, the rest of the MDF should not go along with it because the whole thing will only cover it up and smash it....

The young people are now turned against us. This is our fault. Young people hate nothing more than helplessness and being caught doing something [rajtakaphatosag]. Young people only appreciate pragmatism and firmness.

If we are able to employ fresh forces, if we dare to put them into the seats of old non-party Bolsheviks and we dare put them on pulpits and platforms, and if we dare trust even those who see many things differently, these disgusted young people will come to our side.

At the same time, we must also have the courage to tell these young people frankly the things that we regard as unacceptable: sickliness, the demand to be provided for,

inability to carry out constant work, and the worship of foreign idols. Young people should have great goals.

The Yalta Agreement will end in 1995. By then, the life of every post-Trianon state created around us will be different.... The new century and the new conditions will make the Hungarians face new opportunities and dangers. Naturally, the basic question is whether a new Hungarian generation will come to the fore, a generation able to avoid these new dangers or able to use these new opportunities, which will create a new Hungarian lebensraum.

We must end the unhealthy practice of blaming the skinheads for all that is bad among the youth and of educating them with police methods, while leniently acknowledging other sicknesses, crimes, and cultural crimes. We can no longer recoil from the fact that there are also genetic reasons behind degeneration. We must acknowledge that disadvantaged strata and groups of our society have been with us for too long, groups where the severity of natural selection has not worked because there is no sense in it. Our society should now support the strong and viable families, organized for work and performance, and such families should be presented as emotional examples.

The Last Chance

Therefore, the MDF should frankly admit its offenses against the people and its ingratitude, and should return to the pure sources. Otherwise, the people—who, according to some liberals, do not even exist—will respond with apathy and inertia. At best....

In order to be able to change all this, there is a need for a new MDF. So far, we have appreciated the members who came to us very early and remained active. Naturally, we will have to continue to appreciate these people, but new members are needed for a renewal.

This autumn is the last chance.

The national conference scheduled for the end of this year must create a new program for the 1994 elections, and the MDF cannot avoid a sincere presentation of its situation to the people....

Otherwise, the MDF cannot accept that, with the help of the press and the radio and television, the nomenklatura and the left wing will topple the government and destroy its chances for 1994, because, even in ruins, the MDF is of greater value than a coalition government, and it cannot allow Hungary's leadership to drift back into the hands of the leftist bloc that has been ruling this country continuously since 1945, and has only now been forced to take a break. This would be the end of Hungarians....

Obviously, this carries the danger of a split in the MDF. Naturally, there are parts of the current MDF membership and hierarchy for whom this is unacceptable. However, the following situation has emerged: Despite their better conviction and disastrous lack of proper information, with some kind of desperate confidence and devotion, the basic masses of the MDF accepted their leadership's awkwardness and their government's helplessness....

Therefore, it is now the government's turn to act. The MDF cannot accept continued subordination, withdrawal, media compromises, and contempt....

On Jozsef Antall

All this clearly affects the person of Jozsef Antall.

Jozsef Antall is a big figure in Hungarian politics and his place lies somewhere between Deak [19th century statesman] and Istvan Bethlen [20th century politician] among the compromising, stabilizing, and protecting politicians in Hungarian history. This country would have drifted into chaos long ago without Antall's wisdom, self-restraint, foresight, and calm.

However, fate and God have not been very kind to him and the Hungarians.

As we know, Jozsef Antall is not altogether healthy. Some people have already exploited his illness appallingly: They timed the taxi blockade to coincide with his surgery. He was a trump card for the MDF during the elections in 1990; today, his illness is disturbing. Given the mean people we must face, the communists, it is unimaginable that they will not use Antall's illness against him and against us during the election campaign.

However, let us face facts: Can we expect the people to elect a person who is not completely healthy to be their leader?

Antall is not only a great statesman, but also a tragic hero because, everything that we listed above, things that the MDF must break with, could have been presented differently, namely by saying that, in exchange for all this, Hungary survived, we did not drift into chaos and insolvency, and no citizen had to live in privation and emigrate as a result.

And now, we also ask him to switch and show his own power and the power of his government; we ask this of a man visited by God.

His participation in appointing and training a successor must be guaranteed. This procedure cannot be delayed. The new leadership of the MDF national conference will have to decide on this....

This government has carried out the toughest tasks and the most drastic restructuring processes, and this task has devoured it. Perhaps, there was no other way.

The MDF should not disappear, however, because the MDF is the most specific formation of this Hungarian century and it represents all the values gained, toiled for, and presented in revolutions by the Hungarians,

including all our national frailties. If the MDF collapses, the waves will dash the Hungarians....

Parliament Session Debates Csurka Document

AU0209140492 Budapest MTI in English 1942 GMT 31 Aug 92

[Excerpt] Budapest, 31 Aug (MTI)—The debate which followed the prime minister's address on Monday [31 August] evening also focussed on the political pamphlet published by HDF's [Hungarian Democratic Forum] deputy president in the August 20 issue of the weekly "Magyar Forum".

Contributors from the opposition parties called attention to the dangers entailed by Csurka's theses.

Marton Tardos, head of the parliamentary group of the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), the biggest opposition party, welcomed Antall's conclusions and his dissociation from the pamphlet.

In concert with the prime minister, Tardos emphasised the importance of cooperation. He added, however, that it disturbs the stability of society if in a parliamentary democracy the opposition and the president of the Republic are viewed as evil forces. It would be harshly unconstitutional, he said, that the rights of some minorities could be curtailed, as suggested by the pamphlet. What Csurka terms as a Hungarian lebensraum may be another source of danger, Tardos said, asking the HDF and the prime minister to dissociate themselves from these ideas.

Taking the floor because of being attacked personally, Csurka denied that the pamphlet suggested curtailing the rights of Gypsies and Jews.

Laszlo Kover (Federation of Young Democrats) said that the forces which could drive Hungary, this island of stability, into Balkan-type chaos have begun to dictate even within the governing party of this country.

Kover urged the HDF to adopt a clear position. He emphasised that, by issuing statements "glossing over the essence", the HDF organs "made some Nazi ideas acceptable." The fact that the HDF has been captured by Csurka may bring about the fall of the government, Kover said.

Imre Konya, head of the HDF parliamentary group, rejected Kover's "generalising judgments."

Zoltan Gal, head of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Socialist Party, said, "The socialists condemn those who give priority to supposed party interests over national interests and are not afraid of making unconstitutional and anti-democratic statements. This may bring about anarchy in political life and drive the country into a civil war... For this reason, the HSP takes a stand against the views expounded in Csurka's pamphlet."

Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, the last contributor to the debate, said, "We are standing on the foundation of the rule of law. The events some MPs [members of parliament] spoke of will not take place. Some of their statements do harm to Hungary and endanger the country's stability." [passage omitted]

Cultural, Scientific Accord Signed With Slovenia

LD0209191192 Budapest MTI in English 1752 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Budapest, September 2 (MTI)—A five-year agreement on cultural, educational and scientific cooperation between Hungary and Slovenia, and an intergovernmental cultural work schedule were signed in the Budapest Ministry of Education and Culture on Wednesday [2 September].

The two ministers, Bertalan Andrasfalvy and Slavko Gaber, later told reporters that the agreement provides for cooperation between the academies, scientific research centres, schools, cultural and church organizations, and professional unions.

The sides undertook to promote exchanges of information and informative materials on these fields, the propagation, translation and publishing of literary works, the organization of concerts, theatrical performances and exhibitions, and exchanges of radio and television programmes.

They will support direct cooperation between local authorities and the teaching of each others languages.

Democratic Forum Official Views Party Prospects

AU0309075892 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Aug 92 p 5

[Interview with Lajos Fur, Hungarian Democratic Forum executive chairman, by Zoltan Fekete; place and date not given: "The Hungarian Democratic Forum Continues To Be a Center Party"]

[Text] [Fekete] Given recent events, we can justifiably suppose that Hungary is facing a hot autumn. In your opinion, has the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] become weaker or stronger in the two years since it gained power?

[Fur] If there is a really hot autumn to follow this extremely hot summer, then everything will be razed. I hope that an autumn with more rain and more balance will follow.

Speaking seriously, we can expect a hotter mood in politics because a series of basic laws will be debated in parliament, such as the media law and the new defense law. All this could lead to a lot of debate and occasionally, to strong confrontation. The mood is even getting hotter outside parliament because the election period is getting closer. As for your question about the MDF's

weakness or strength, I can say that the MDF has become weaker from a certain point of view: A considerable number of its members have left the party. Unfortunately, groups of intelligentsia turned away from the MDF and from all other political parties, and they can be regarded as a sensitive loss. In addition, we began to carry out a deliberate internal recruitment, and we have already succeeded in "registering" many new members. For example, 100-150 new members a month joined the MDF this year, and this can be regarded as a serious number if we think in terms of annual average. Today, there are about 30,000 MDF members.

It is another matter that, in my opinion, we would need about 40,000 or 60,000 members to carry out a successful election campaign. The problem is with the unequal distribution of our members throughout the country. MDF organizations exist in every smaller or bigger town, but we have neither groups nor even a single member sometimes in the regions dotted with small villages. Therefore, our goal is to expand the MDF in such a way as to ensure that we have at least one sympathizer in every village, a sympathizer on whom we will be able to rely during the election campaign.

[Fekete] How did the fact that a large part of our society turned away from politics affect the MDF?

[Fur] The aforementioned departure of intellectuals is part of this process. Unfortunately, some of our 800 organizations are not living organizations. Some leaders are working, but the members cannot be activated politically.

[Fekete] What cure have you found to overcome this apathy?

[Fur] We would like to activate our existing membership, and we need organizational changes for this. We want to work out an election program capable of mobilizing both our members and our sympathizers.

[Fekete] It has become almost a legend that the MDF is kept together by its three wings. Do these pillars still exist?

[Fur] Yes, they do. They are alive and active. Thank heavens, the Christian Democratic, the national, and the national liberal wings are working and politicizing together because, this way, the MDF is able to cover a broader spectrum of genuine politics. If any of these wings left the MDF, considerable groups would be missing from the MDF membership and camp.

[Fekete] One hears about the debates between various wings.

[Fur] Various smaller or greater frictions and debates have occurred, but these have only been temporary debates. Today, we have succeeded in creating a harmony between the three trends, and their cooperation will not be burdened by new tensions. I hope they will continue to be the MDF's firm pillars.

[Fekete] Recent debates have questioned the MDF's center party nature.

[Fur] The MDF continues to be a center party, and it will not move toward any kind of extremism. This is true even if there are different political views within the center. I think that every MDF politician believes in this center politics, despite the occasional differences of views. Such debates are inevitably present in every political movement, including the MDF. This nation has had so much bitter experience—precisely in the 20th century—with the extent of damage incurred by extremists that we should not deal with politics in a different manner today, even according to the lessons of our political traditions. It is also a fact that the bulk of our society is made up of people with balanced thinking, and those inclined to extremism are most active at the fringes of our society.

[Fekete] Does this mean that one who is in the center can win the elections or that every political party running in the elections will strive toward a center position?

[Fur] It is natural that the center will win the next elections, and it is natural that the MDF will be the winner. The center party, the MDF, is not only democratic but also thinks in terms of the nation, and we know that, in this region, it is vital to accept the national issue today, and it seems that only the MDF is really ready to do that.

[Fekete] When will the election campaign start?

[Fur] As early as this autumn one will be able to feel the premonitory signs of the elections; however, the election campaign must not start too early—only two to three months before the actual elections. Now, we are in the phase of thorough preparations.

[Fekete] Many people think that the national conference scheduled for this autumn could be a turning point in the life of the MDF.

[Fur] That is certain in one respect: The mandate of the current leadership and the current presidium will be over. We will have to elect a new presidium, and a complete renewal will take place at the end of November.

'Small Constitution' Criticized by Senate Body

AU0309121592 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 1 Sep 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "What Happens to the Small Constitution?"]

[Text] The Small Constitution, which was approved by the Sejm on 1 August, is still awaiting approval by the Senate and the president's signature. A Senate Constitutional Commission meeting on 31 August sharply criticized the document, and even suggested that it be rejected altogether.

At its next meeting in four days, the commission will produce a written opinion of the Small Constitution based on the opinions of legal experts, senators, and press material on the subject. The commission wants to present this opinion before the Senate at the next Senate session on 10 September.

The commission was very critical of the document. The article detailing the procedure for forming a government aroused the greatest controversy. The commission was unanimous that the procedure is too lengthy and could paralyze the functioning of the state. Dr. Andrzej Rzeplinski said it might encourage the Sejm to apply all the possible alternative methods of forming a government, especially the ultimate method, "which guarantees the emergence of a government dependent on the Sejm." Prof. Michal Pietrzak suggested a "simpler and more effective" way of forming a government whereby the president would appoint and dismiss the prime minister, the prime minister would recommend to the president a Council of Ministers lineup, and the president would then either approve or disapprove that lineup. According to Prof. Zbigniew Witkowski, in a parliamentary democracy the first step in forming a government should be taken by the Sejm, and not, as the Small Constitution says, the president.

The commission stated that although the document differentiates between the various authorities and balances out their powers, "there are some provisions that not so much balance out the authorities as encourage keen competition between them"

It was considered essential to define new powers for the Constitutional Tribunal.

Most members of the commission agreed that the Small Constitution restricts the powers of the president, despite the long list of powers contained therein. It was agreed that the president's right to call for the dismissal of a government be retained.

The commission also indicated that the Small Constitution diminishes the role of the Senate.

Trade Unions Meet To Discuss Strategy

LD0309085292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] The meeting of trade union representatives organized by the National Trade Union Alliance Mazowsze Region Protest Committee lasted more than two hours. It was attended by the heads of the six trade unions comprising the Interunion National Negotiating and Strike Committee. Magdalena Winiarczyk reports on what was discussed:

The meeting was a very stormy one. Extremely hard-hitting words were spoken about the arrogance of the authorities, about democracy, [word indistinct] democracy and the next regime, about the country's sell-out, and about the total abandonment of the slogans and demands fought for by the workers since 1980.

Marian Jurczyk of Solidarity-80 cited the Tychy Small Car Plant as an example of the possibility of losing the country's economic sovereignty. Until just recently, 90 percent of the parts used in the cars assembled there were Polish; now 97 percent of the parts are foreign. This leads to job losses here and the creation of new jobs in other countries. [Words indistinct] the government shows great reluctance to enter into talks, so negotiations have to be forced, even by means of such radical action as a general strike. This was demanded by Andrzej Lepper [Self-Defense Agricultural Trade Union].

However, the majority of those present were in favor of radicalization of protest actions in the form of street demonstrations. This formula is the one accepted in the position adopted at the end of the meeting. In that document we also find support for all forms of protest undertaken by increasingly determined factory workforces and opposition regarding attempts to frighten the strikers.

Making such attempts, I quote, shows the contempt for employees' interests by those people, who came to power through the workers' struggle against the totalitarian system.

With this position, the trade union leaders gathered for another meeting of the negotiating and strike committee. They are considering whether and when to organize the demanded demonstrations and are also talking about the work of the experts, which has been going on since the morning. Their task is to write out the 21 demands put forward by the committee as specific moves.

This meeting is taking place behind closed doors. No communique is envisaged. The question remains open as to whether further protest actions will continue to be backed by the six trade unions, or perhaps there will be more of them because Ewa Swychalska said at a meeting with trade union activists that after recent talks, the possibility is taking shape of expanding the committee. Further unification of the trade union movement will center around the most important employee issues.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Arrives in Bucharest

AU0309091392 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0800 GMT 3 Sep 92

[Text] Mr. Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine foreign minister, arrived in Bucharest less than one hour ago at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart, Adrian Nastase. The guest was welcomed at the airport by Adrian Nastase and other Romanian officials.

Armenian Official Visits; Candidate Invited to Bonn

AU0209183392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1724 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 2/9/1992—The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, told a Wednesday, September 2, news conference that the foreign minister of Armenia, Arman Navasardian [name and title as received], was paying a visit to Bucharest. Wednesday he had consultations with Teodor Melescanu and Constantin Ene, secretaries of state at the said ministry, on the creation of a legal framework for bilateral relations and the development of the cooperation between the two countries. The high officials also exchanged opinions on international issues of mutual interest.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman answered a number of questions referring to an invitation of Germany's Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, that leaders of the Democratic Convention of Romania, and its nominee for Romania's presidency, Emil Constantinescu, visit Bonn.

"We know about this invitation only from the Romanian press, but we do not know exactly who has made the invitation, its reasons, its phrasing", mentioned Ambassador Traian Chebeleu. "But I think what I have to say is that the Romanian Government considers it has a duty of honor to make everything it can to ensure conditions for free and correct elections on September 27. It is reasonable, at the same time, to expect and hope that foreign governments as well, that have repeatedly stressed the importance they grant to the way elections are held in Romania, will refrain from actions that could influence the elections campaign in Romania, we have recently addressed the Hungarian Government in a situation that could have had repercussions on the political climate in Romania, dominated by the elections campaign now. We shall not hesitate to address other governments as well, if necessary", added the Foreign Ministry spokesman.

Ministry Urges Iraq To Abide by UN Resolutions

AU0209143092 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] At the regular news conference at the Foreign Affairs Ministry today, Foreign Ministry spokesman Traian Chebeleu made the following statement:

Romania's Foreign Affairs Ministry has taken note of the actions recently initiated by the United States and certain partners of the international coalition concerning air surveillance over Iraq south of the 32d parallel and the establishment of a no-fly zone for Iraqi aviation. The measures are intended to protect the Shiite population in that region, given the fact that the Iraqi authorities failed to comply with obligations under Security Council Resolution 688, April 1991, which requires, among other things, respect for the basic rights and freedoms of all citizens of that country and the immediate access for international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance throughout Iraqi territory. The allied decision comes after UN and other observers were refused access to southern Iraq, where they wanted to ascertain the observance of human rights.

Considering that full compliance with Security Council resolutions is the only way to normalize the situation in the Gulf, we express the hope that the Iraqi authorities will take the necessary steps to avoid any confrontation that might jeopardize the stabilization process in that region. This would also clear the way to remove the reasons that have led to the adoption of the latest military measures by the international coalition.

Deportation Agreement Signed With Hungary

LD0209162892 Budapest MTI in English 1917 GMT 1 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Bucharest, September 1 (MTI)—A deportation agreement was signed on Tuesday [1 September] afternoon in Bucharest by Interior Ministers Peter Boross of Hungary and Victor Babiuc of Romania.

Under it, the two countries will take back their own citizens if they have crossed the border illegally, or if they are staying illegally in the other country. The two sides also oblige themselves to take back citizens of third countries who had stayed legally in the other side's territory before illegally crossing the border. Now that this document has been signed, Hungary can conclude a similar agreement with Austria, Boross told MTI.

In addition, Boross and Babiuc signed an agreement on cooperation between the two ministries, and another one for opening two new border crossings by the end of 1993. The two ministries will work together in fighting international terrorism, organised gangs, illegal immigrant smuggling, illicit trade in drugs, gun running, and other crimes. [passage omitted]

Muslims Deny UN Supervision for Heavy Weapons

LD0209151692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1321 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] London, Sept 2 (TANJUG)—Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina will keep at any cost the promise given at the London conference and collect weapons under U.N. supervision at 11 points by Wednesday [2 September] noon, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said in a direct interview to the B.B.C. on Wednesday morning.

In contrast to Karadzic, Bosnian Ambassador to the U N. Muhamed Secerbegovic on Wednesday told journalists that the Moslem side signed no obligation in London on putting its own heavy weaponry under U.N. supervision "because it does not possess such weapons in larger quantities."

The international Conference on Yugoslavia, held in London last week, adopted special decisions which will be applied to the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was agreed to establish international control over heavy weaponry in the former Yugoslav republic.

Directly asked by the B.B.C. reporter whether Moslems would respond to the "Serb concessions," Secerbegovic answered that "Serbs are aggressors, war criminals" and that he represents the "legitimate Bosnian Government which speaks for Moslems, Croats and Serbs."

The Serb representatives quit all government bodies in Bosnia-Hercegovina on April 7, after the European Community, upon the insistence of the Moslem-Croat coallition, had recognized the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The majority of the population in the ethnically mixed former Yugoslav republic are Moslems. They account for 44 percent, followed by Serbs with 32 percent and Croats with 17 percent.

Observers in London on Wednesday note that the election of Finnish diplomat Marti Ahtisari as head of the working group on Bosnia at the U.N./E.C. steering committee in Geneva "could be a positive sign." He demanded "patience, not hasty magic solutions" on the eve of negotiations.

Ahtisari frequently conducted actions, including the one which led to the independence of Namibia in 1990, and he was praised on several occasions from the Organization of African Unity. The difference in approach between him and Lord Owen is evident - he did not start his mission by "conditional threats," but by confidence building.

Presidency Member Rules Out Talks With Karadzic

LD0209190192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1741 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Sep (TANJUG)—Stjepan Kljujic, a member of the rump Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, told a press conference in Sarajevo today that "there can be no negotiations" with Radovan Karadzic and the Serb Democratic Party.

Radio Sarajevo reported Kljujic as saying: "I will be among those who will demand a fight to the end because I am convinced that the peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina deserve to be rid off this evil once and for all."

Kljujic accused the Serbs of having 183 camps holding, according to him, "about 100,000 people" on the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Serb side denies the existence of concentration camps, and some eminent world politicians and institutions have expressed similar doubts.

Izetbegovic Seeks Air Support or Weapons

LD0209230292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2127 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, September 2 (TANJUG)—The leader of Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, said on Wednesday [2 September] he wanted air support or weapons, not foreign troops, in this war-torn former Yugoslav republic.

During a meeting with Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorwald Stoltenberv, Izetbegovic said that if a military intervention from the air was impossible, he would settle for weapons, Sarajevo Radio reported.

The radio, monitored in Belgrade, cited Izetbegovic as saying that "Europe and the world cannot refuse one of these two requests."

On the other hand, a leader of Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Stjepan Kljujic, said on Wednesday there could be no negotiations with the leader of Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Radovan Karadzic, and the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party.

Sarajevo Radio cited Kljujic as telling a news conference that he would be among those who would demand a fight to the end, because he was convinced that the peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina deserved to do away with this evil once and for all.

UN's Goulding Arrives, Meets Izetbegovic

AU0309084792 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 3 Sep 92

[Text] Marrack Goulding, assistant UN secretary general for peace operations, arrived in Sarajevo this morning. As announced this morning, he will visit the soldiers of the French battalion in the capital city of Bosnia-Hercegovina and some artillery positions around Sarajevo. This morning, he will also hold talks with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina. A meeting with Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party, is planned to take place after that.

During his visit to Bosnia-Hercegovina, Goulding will establish details concering the negotiations on the control of heavy arms in Sarajevo, Gorazde, Bihac, and Jajce so that the start of the countdown of 96 hours can be set for establishing this control. As envisaged, Goulding will end his visit to Sarajevo tonight.

Delegation Leaves for Geneva, Reiterates Stand

LD0309103292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0903 GMT 3 Sep 92

[Text] Pale, 3 Sep (TANJUG)—A Muslim delegation which is to represent the current Sarajevo government at the Geneva conference has left for Geneva. The delegation includes Hajrudin Somun, the republican adviser for foreign policy issues, and Kasim Trnka, a member of the experts' group.

It has been officially announced that the stands that the delegation will advocate at the Geneva conference are the rejection of any negotiations as long as attacks on towns in Bosnia-Hercegovina are under way and that there are to be "no negotiations with war criminals." The delegation is also obliged to refuse to negotiate on the cantonization of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

As is known, one of the principles adopted at the London conference is an obligation for all interested sides to negotiate irrespective of circumstances.

Serbs Accuse Croatian Army of Using Poison Gas

LD0209215892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2117 GMT 2 Sep 92

["Pool" item]

[Text] Banja Luka, September 2 (TANJUG)—The headquarters of the First Krajina Corps of the Army of the Serbian Republic on Wednesday [2 September] evening accused the regular forces of the Republic of Croatia of using poison gas in the fighting in Northern Bosnia.

A statement issued by the Krajina Corps Information Office said that a number of chemical missiles were fired on Serbian positions in Northern Bosnia on Tuesday. Eight Serbian fighters have been taken to Banja Luka hospital, six are in critical condition.

Their blood samples have been sent to the military hospital in Belgrade which will determine what poison gas was used. The representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Banja Luka has been informed about the incident.

The Croatian forces on Tuesday used poison gas for the third time in the past two months in Northern Bosnia, the Krajina Corps statement said, and its earlier warnings to the domestic and international public have not yielded any results.

The Krajina Corps headquarters on Wednesday again warned the Croatian side it would no longer tolerate the bombardment of Serbian positions and villages from the territory of the Republic of Croatia and that it would return fire if attacked.

Internee Camp Security Chief Interviewed

92BA1369A Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 19 Aug 92 p 7

[Part four of a series by Zoltan Nemeth including discussions with Pero Curguzzal, Red Cross representative, and Slobodan Kurzovic, security chief at the Trnopolje internment camp; date not given: "The Road to Uncertainty (Part 4); The Prison of 'Free People'"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

"All of Us Will Starve to Death"

The Trnopolje camp consists of the village school, the school yard, and the adjacent soccer field. The name of the school is Bratstvo (Brotherhood).

I am horrified by the scene that unfolds before my eyes. This must not be a camp; it certainly must serve as a temporary place to stay for relatives of the residents of the camp. Only Gypsy camps near or on top of large city garbage dumps look like the Trnopolje [camp]: these are tents improvised of blankets, sheets, nylon bags and cardboard boxes. Skin-and-bones people lie on the ground inside these tents.

An offensive stench permeates the air.

Unshaven, emaciated faces turn toward us.

I am conversing with Pero Curguz at first. He is an employee of the Prijedor Red Cross. I smell brandy from time to time as he talks.

"There are about 3,000 people in the camp. This is an open refugee camp. People come here, those who escaped from the war, who were left without a roof over their heads, who are looking for their relatives. We operate a rather good search service, except that it does not function now because there is no electricity, and the data is stored in a computer."

"How many people have already left this place?"

"More than 7,000."

"Do you know where they went?"

"To parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina held by Muslims, to the republics of the former Yugoslavia, abroad."

"What provisions do the residents of the camp receive?"

"Unfortunately, increasingly no provisions at all. We hardly have any food left. We have nothing to eat. All of us will starve to death unless we receive aid from somewhere within a day or two."

When the Serbs, Too, Are Let Go

The other man for whom I have a few questions before going to see the internees is Slobodan Kurzovic, the security chief at the camp. We converse while standing on the street. Residents of the camp surround us and listen to what the chief has to say.

"How is public security inside the camp?"

"There is no trouble at all with these people."

"Are they free to move?"

"They are entirely free."

"Could they go home, or let's say to Prijedor, if they wanted to?"

"Not for the time being. We do not let them out from here for their own safety. They certainly do not face danger at this place. These people did not take up arms against us, and therefore the Muslim extremists would harm them. They fired periodic shots at the camp with telescopic rifles when the camp opened, but we chased away those who fired the shots."

"When are these people going to be allowed to leave this place?"

"You must be aware that the same kinds of camps also exist on the Muslim and the Croatian sides, where Serbs are held under much more austere conditions [than what we have], where they torture the people and rape the women. We will let the Muslims return home as soon as the politicians reach an agreement to permit Serbs to return home from those camps. I, personally, am confident that this is going to take place within a few days."

Muslim Internees Relate Camp Experiences

92BA1369B Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 20 Aug 92 p 5

[Part five of a series by Zoltan Nemeth: "The Road to Uncertainty (Part 5); Among the Interned"]

[Text] They let us in among the internees (refugees?) without an escort.

I barely moved away from the security chief, when a few men surrounded me.

"Nothing is true of what this crook told you," one of them said.

"That we are free people? Come, take a look at this great freedom."

They are guiding me. An increasing number of people gather around me. They tell their stories, and tell me and complain about their fate.

The Muslims Did Not Take Up Arms

"I am Ilijas Trnjanin. See that house there with [two] floors? That's my house. I was watching from here the way they removed my furniture and everything I had, and I am now watching as someone is moving in. He is a Serb, for sure. Because in Trnopolje only the Serbs and the Ukrainians were allowed to stay at home in their houses. From among 1,150 houses, 150 belonged to Serbs and 150 to Ukrainians. They herded all of us Muslims here. They do not let me go home, they do not let us go anywhere from here."

A man shrunk [to skin and bones] steps next to me and shows me the top of his head. It has a large, scabby wound. He says nothing. He has no strength to as much as saying something. The man next to him says that this man weighed 100 kilograms a few months ago. They broke his head with a revolver at the infamous Keraterm [internment camp].

The Muslims in the neighborhood did not take up arms. The Serbs themselves state this. They did not want to wage war, they did not want to threaten their neighbors with weapons. They established a fixed date in May after the Yugoslav People's Army had withdrawn, [or] more accurately, when the army of Serbs in Bosnia had been formed out of [that army] and had assumed power. Armed Muslims were obligated to hand in their weapons by that date. They did so.

"They evacuated every Muslim village on 26 May. On that day they perpetrated a real slaughter in Prijedor, they blew up the 200-year-old mosque. All mosques in the area suffered the same fate, except the one in Trnopolje. They left that [standing] so that you, the representatives of international organizations, could see a mosque. They herded us to two camps. One of these was in Omarsk. That camp still exists, supposedly it is going to be discontinued in a few days. Not because they let the internees go home. No. Some of the internees from Omarsk were brought here, others to Maljaca, to the prisoner camp established at the huge military base. The other camp, the most infamous one, was in Keraterm. That place is a refractory brick works built not too long ago."

The Daily Quota Is a Ladle of Watery Soup

It is lunch time. People receive their daily quota [of food]. As a Belgrade newspaper put it later: their free meal. I do not wish for anyone to have this kind of free meal. A ladle of watery soup—water with flour—in which one or two green beans cut in half float around—exceptionally, in "our honor." They do not receive bread. Anyone who wishes to buy bread may do so for the paltry sum of 1,000 dinars. (What kind of man would want to get rich on selling bread to these unfortunate people for 1,000 dinars, at ten times the [regular] price?) Even the ones who have money hardly dare to order bread, because their guards watch them, then beat the leftover bread out of them the next day. Some cook one

or two potatoes received from a visitor or smuggled in on metal plates supported by a brick.

"I survived the horrors of Keraterm. I will not give you my name because I am afraid to do so. (Several men encourage him, and one suggests that we prepare a list of the names of all 3,000-4,000 people. Let the world know about them.) I will tell you only a few things. First of all, when they herded us in the factory yard they immediately executed about 200 people. They executed another 25 the next day. Our guards frequently amused themselves by making us kneel in a circle in the evening. We had to face the inside of the circle while they beat and assaulted all of us from behind. On other occasions they drove cars inside the factory building and raced the cars all over while firing shots. Such 'amusements' always claimed a few victims. On one occasion many of us were locked into a room without a window. They kept us there for two hours in 55 degrees [C] (heat). They hung a thermometer inside [the room] for us to see it."

Interned Guest Worker

Kozarac had 25,000 inhabitants, all of them Muslims, all of them interned. More than 10,000 Muslims lived in Prijedor and its vicinity. All of them are interned now. The Serbs were a minority in the vicinity, they now constitute an absolute majority. Any Muslim entering the city by chance would hardly be able to make a living, because everything could be purchased only upon presentation of papers.

Three-fourths of the "residents" of the Trnopolje camp could go abroad to relatives. They certainly would accept them and put them to work. A man who has been working abroad for more than 20 years came home to search for his relatives. He found no one, and the big search ended in his arrest and in his being taken to the Trnopolje camp. [This happened to] the foreigner, an entirely free man.

I conversed with him. He has shrunk the same way as all the others have. In telling about himself he says that he feels that he has gone insane as a result of this entire [situation]. No sane mind can understand what has happened to him, and what has happened to everyone in Bosnia-Hercegovina. One can only go crazy from all this.

Karadzic and parliamentary representatives who curtsy with him, and who were at Banjaluk at the time of our visit, appeared as neither insane nor starved. "I am living in my own homeland by now...," the statement he made the previous evening echoed [in my ears].

Finance Minister Interviewed on Budget

92BA1349A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 21 Aug 92 p 2

[Article including interview with Bosnian Finance Minister Zarko Primorac by Zdravko Latal; place and date not given: "Bosnia-Hercegovina Has Already Opened Accounts for Donors' Money Orders for Rebuilding"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Bosnia-Hercegovina Finance Minister Dr. Zarko Primorac stated what kind of attitude his state has toward foreign currencies on its territory, and spoke about the budget and the rebuilding of Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H].

Sarajevo, 20 Aug—Perhaps states without a traditional army have existed, but undoubtedly there has not been a single one without its own money and a monetary, financial, and tax system. Until just recently B-H did not have any of these necessary elements, and the war is certainly no justification at all. It was only on 17 August that a B-H dinar was put into circulation, but a wartime budget has not yet been formulated, nor has a monetary, financial, and tax system. We spoke about everything that they intend to do with the new finance minister in the B-H Government, a professor at the Sarajevo Economics School, Dr. Zarko Primorac.

[Latal] What has happened with Bosnia-Hercegovina's currency since the beginning of the year?

[Primorac] We finally put the money into circulation. We should have done this much earlier, even before the war; and don't ask me why it was not done. I have only been in the government for about 50 days. We printed our dinar in the worst possible circumstances, in the middle of the turmoil of war and the occupation of about half the state's territory. Of course we had difficulties in transporting the money to the liberated territories, but we overcame those difficulties. We also prepared security measures in time for the period of replacing the money, in order to protect the republic's economy from speculations by individuals, as well as the occupation forces.

[Latal] Now four substitute means of payment are in circulation—the Croatian dinar, the B-H dinar, the dinar of the so-called Serbian Republic of B-H, and value coupons, if we do not take German marks into account. Has the monetary cantonization of B-H thus actually been carried out already?

[Primorac] The legal authorities do not control the republic's entire territory for the time being, and because of interrupted communications it is not even possible to contact those areas where the authorities still function. Whenever there is a war, it is not unusual at all for various substitutes for the official currency to be in circulation. The Croatian dinar thus appeared in several parts of Hercegovina, and also Bosnia, as a consequence of commercial transactions. We do not have any information about its having been sent legally from Croatia. At the same time, the Serbian dinar has also appeared. Our attitude toward that money is the same as the legal state's attitude toward the so-called Serbian Republic of B-H. In some people's opinion, our attitude toward the Croatian dinar is very controversial. In my opinion, there should not be any difficulties with this; our attitude should be the same as toward any other recognized

currency of a recognized state. We defined a parity, and the Croatian dinar will quite certainly be in circulation. In a psychological sense, money is very similar to religion. If people believe in a certain currency, they will use it, regardless of all the authorities' measures and desires. The best example of this is the mark. That is why I would not think about whether we are already facing some sort of monetary cantonization. Actually, no one has yet even defined the political framework for cantonization. Our dinar has become the legal state's official currency.

[Latal] The government has not yet presented its own work program, but one of the priority tasks will undoubtedly be financing the liberation war. Is this true?

[Primorac] I will only talk about the past month and a half. The Finance Ministry has proposed a budget for B-H, and the proposal is now being worked on. I would not like to talk about why seven months passed without a budget's being formulated. The previous government dealt with that. The budget also provides for funds for financing the war. Discussions of the budget are at the same time discussions of financing the B-H army.

In the past month, the government did everything possible, within the limits of its capabilities, to cover the financial needs of defense and the liberation struggle. It will be hard to secure the budget funds, since we are at war. Some people would like to intervene using noneconomic sources that are not completely legal. Any issuance of money that exceeds economic capabilities is counterproductive and I will advocate legal economic options. We will undoubtedly see inflation, but it has to be controlled.

[Latal] One can hear proposals from abroad that B-H should open foreign exchange accounts for donors' money orders for rebuilding and developing the state. Will it be possible to do this?

[Primorac] Of course; we are already dealing seriously with this now, and we have already opened several accounts.

[Latal] In order for the currency to become functional, basic capabilities have to be ensured, such as the commerce and operation of financial institutions. Has this already been ensured?

[Primorac] It is true that the system's financial institutions have to function. In this regard we have planned a whole series of actions, and some of them have already been accomplished. The National Bank of B-H and commercial banks were dangerously threatened by various pressures, which abated after the new government was put together. If B-H wants to preserve the reputation of its banking mechanism, however, our banks' guarantees have to be recognized and respected, and it is necessary to preserve their legality and creditworthiness. We have to internationalize our attitude toward the banking world, and make the commitment that B-H will settle all its obligations when that is realistically possible. We have to advise world financial institutions right now that we want to be included in the civilized world, even though now we are certainly not much like it at all. It is necessary to convince them that we would like to develop an economic system that is like theirs, and that we will carry out the process of property transformation.

[Latal] B-H's economy has been destroyed, so to speak. According to some optimistic assumptions, only about 20 percent of the total capacity is still functioning. Rebuilding and development are directly dependent upon financial success. Could B-H rebuilt in 10 years everything that has been destroyed in these five months without foreign aid?

[Primorac] Without the establishment of an international fund for rebuilding and development, which we are seriously discussing, it will not be possible to rebuild the economy effectively. Property and economic transformation are to be carried out within the framework of that fund. The fund should be established on the basis of two things. The first is foreign aid, since the international community still owes us something morally. We acted according to their guidelines for establishing the state. We could have assumed that the elimination of the former regime would not be painless. When we were attacked, we did not receive any aid, so to speak, except verbal aid. In the second place, with that fund we should throw the door wide open to foreign capital, in order for it to participate in the restructuring processes. Since capital is very cautious, we have decided to ask several friendly states to encourage their owners of capital who want to come to B-H to do so.

Army 'Ready' To Open Krajina Corridor

92BA1336A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Aug 92 p 4

[Article by D. Blazevic: "Corridor Toward the 'Krajina'"]

[Text] Sibenik—Everything is ready, they say in the command headquarters of the 113th Brigade of the HV [Croatian Army], to open up a corridor from the direction of Sibenik in the direction of the "Krajina." Passage for teams of the United Nations and Ministry of Defense [UN-MO] will be opened at two points—in the area of Cista Mala-Dragisici and Gardijani-Dubravice. The condition that the Croatian side set for opening up these corridors, which had to do with completely eliminating the "Krajina" military and police units from occupied Cista Mala and Gardijani, has been entirely met according to the UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force], and, they say in the command headquarters of the 113th Brigade of the HV, the passages in the direction of the so-called Serbian Krajina will be controlled exclusively by Croatian police.

Colonel Ante Ljubicic, Sibenik communications officer and coordinator for relations with the UNPROFOR, also told us that the counterdemand of the Croatian side to the request of the "Krajina authorities" that the Sibenik police withdraw from Miljevci, withdrawal of the chetniks from the entire area of Drnis—was judged in the UNPROFOR headquarters in Knin to be a constructive proposal that certainly should be examined. However, on the basis of past experience it is difficult to believe that the UN Protective Force could have any very significant influence on the police and army of the "Krajina." What is more, there is every prospect that the Serbian side intends to put off as long as possible commencement of the third phase of the Vance plan, which calls for demilitarization of the so-called pink zones, as best confirmed by the new chetnik ultimatums concerning Miljevci.

That is, the exhumation of bodies of the "Krajina" people who died on the square in Miljevci, which was begun at one time and was interrupted because of objective difficulties, is now being used once again as the occasion for new Serbian blackmail whereby the chetniks are attempting to gain time and sidestep the Vance plan. Two days ago the disagreements over Miljevci escalated when the Knin territorial-defense people, with the help and escort of the UNPROFOR and without any prior notification of the Croatian Army, reached the Miljevci Plateau, allegedly for exhumation, but the Croatian police intervened in the only possible manner in such a situation—they prevented them from entering Miljevci villages and sent them back where they came from, as the incident was related by Roko Mijic, acting commander of the 142d Brigade of the HV.

The announced convoy of people from Drnis toward the villages of Promina, which would be humanitarian in nature and was scheduled for 15 August, will probably remain an initiative never realized. The reason is simple—the chetniks, who long ago occupied part of the Drnis region, do not want to even hear of any aid to the hungry and ill Croats imprisoned in the villages in Promina, and the UNPROFOR is helpless! But because it is impossible to help the threatened Croatian population in this occupied area, there have been more and more requests from the people in Promina reaching the command of the 113th and 142d Brigades of the HV through the UNPROFOR to withdraw from these disastrous pink areas to free territory.

The situation is disturbing, they say in the command of the 142d Brigade, especially because of the refugees from Drnis, who are becoming increasingly impatient, and there is a justified fear, Mijic says, that those driven out could begin to go back to the Drnis area on their own, haphazardly and unorganized, at least to share the fate of their imprisoned countrymen from Promina, whom the chetniks, among other things and before the eyes of the UNPROFOR, so it is said, are driving into pigsties under the hottest sun and not allowing to come out until nighttime.

Deadlock Over Reconstruction of Key Bridge Viewed

92BA1353G Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 21 Aug 92 p 28

[Article by Ivica Marijacic: "How To Build New Maslenica Bridge: There Is No Other Shore"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] On one side of Novski Channel are Croatian soldiers, and on the other side are chetniks who are not interested in a change in the status quo.

Only around 300 meters separate the two banks of Novski Channel. Nevertheless, it is an unbridgeable distance for Croatia, even though the need to bridge it has long been imperative and urgent. Since 21 November of last year, when chetniks destroyed Maslenica Bridge, connecting the two banks has become the main infrastructure task of the Croatian Government, because the destruction of that bridge meant that southern and northern Croatia were practically unconnected. The documentation for a new bridge has been drawn up, bidding by contractors has begun, and there would also be around six million German marks for expenses, but this job remains nothing more than a vain hope for Croatia, because the occupying army neither wants nor intends to withdraw from the other side of the channel. And the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] does not ensure access.

On one shore of Novski Channel are Croatian soldiers, and on the other shore are chetniks. It is not hard to get to the southern, free side of the channel. You just have to muster up a little will and courage, accept the risks, and immortalize the gaping channel with your camera, with the few remnants of construction at the base of the former bridge, which was one of the most beautiful ones

ever built in Croatia. Only a few pieces of iron jut out, parts of the bridge's support pillars. Everything else was swallowed up by the 40-meter-deep sea. This is a dreadful example of the human destruction and primitivism that only the Serbian occupier is able to manifest today.

On "our" side, the group consisted of several Croatian soldiers and one member of the UN Protection Force, a Frenchman, whose job it was to make sure that no one fires at the other side of the channel. On the other side, several chetniks were lounging around in the cool air, together with another UNPROFOR member performing the same task. Just then, at the nearby "Plitvice" motel, on the occupied side, a meeting of the so-called mixed commission was being held, comprising representatives of Croatia, UNPROFOR, the European Community, and the local authorities (Serbs). In a certain sense, this was a guarantee that there would be no shooting. And there was no shooting.

From the free shore, one has an excellent view of Maslenica, which is part of occupied Jasenice. Everything is deserted. There is not a living soul on the shores of Maslenica. Our soldiers say that sometimes chetniks go for a stroll, jump in the water, and sunbathe, but rarely. For the most part, Maslenica is sacredly deserted.

Sometimes chetniks from the other shore of Maslenica Channel talk to our soldiers on this side by radio. They ask them utterly prosaic things, such as "Ujo (Ustashi—Ed.), what time is it?" and similar things. They do not forget to mention that they will never withdraw from the other shore and, in general, from the land that they have captured because, as they say, "why then have we fought and had so many victims?"

"And what is your response to that?" I ask our youths, Ivica, Nediljko, and Vinko.

"I believe them when they say that they will not withdraw," says Ivica from Islam Latinski, "but I let them know that our five minutes will come, sooner or later."

Nediljko and Vinko have similar thoughts, and they warn me to step back a little, since one never knows whether sniper fire will come whizzing in from the other side. After 10 minutes of picture-taking, I obey them and step back into the shade provided by the wall of the former "Dalmatinske Noci" inn on the former Maslenica Bridge. Vinko and Nediljko are also from Islam Latinski. Their town is 10 km to the south, near Zeleni Hrast, one of the first to be occupied. They say that everything was burned down in Islam Latinski and that they have nothing to go back to. They say that this only gives them more motivation to persevere in the struggle. They have nothing else to lose.

As we return from Novski Channel, in the direction of Posedarje, Slivnica, and Zadar, everything to our left is occupied territory. The Novigradsko Sea is deserted, and has probably never offered such a gloomy picture. In Posedarje, we notice, people are trying to get things back to normal, but nothing is completely certain since the occupying soldiers watch from the elevation of Podgradina, a little to the south of Posedarje.

The next day, I read in the newspaper that nothing was agreed to at the meeting in the "Plitvice" motel. The local Serbian side even withdrew from the talks, justifying this move by alleging that the Croatian side is violating the cease-fire. This is stupid and preposterous, one of the numerous tricks used by the so-called other side, in whose interest it is for the general agony to continue as long as possible, for nothing to budge from the current deadlock. In fact, it makes no difference whether the Serbs come to the meeting or boycott it. They continue to be unwilling to consider any sort of solution or compromise, because they regard everything that they have captured as their own territory. Including the northern side of the Maslenica Channel. That is the border, they think.

In this way, the chances that local Serbs will see reason are falling away one by one, so that even the peace that prevails in this region is extremely relative. A new Maslenica Bridge remains in the realm of dreams and vain hopes. But Croatia is in a terrible hurry. The two shores of Novski Channel must be connected, but "how do you build a bridge when there is no other shore?" as Zadar poet Miljenko Mando says.

Federal

Ruling Party Announces Stand on No-Confidence Vote

LD0209174192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1623 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Sep (TANJUG)—If the Federal Government and its president accept "well-intentioned and substantiated criticism and political warnings," the executive committee of the Serbian Socialist Party [SPS] recommends that SPS deputies not pass a vote of no confidence in the government, the SPS main committee announced today.

The statement further says that the SPS executive committee, during a session held today and attended by Borisav Jovic, concluded that serious reasons existed for the Yugoslav Assembly to carry out a thorough critical analysis of the Federal Government's performance.

The SPS deputies are expected at the upcoming session of the Yugoslav Assembly to put forth their views on and objections to the performance of the government and its president and also to insist that the Assembly publicly define which objections it had to the work of the government and which changes in the government's work the Assembly expected to see.

A demand for a motion of no confidence was submitted by a group of SPS deputies even before the party adopted a position on this issue, we read in today's statement, in which the SPS describes it as a sign of the freedom of initiative on the part of SPS deputies.

The executive committee of the SPS main committee said that the London conference "marked significant progress toward a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis."

The SPS will "insist that all responsible factors in our country consistently observe and implement the decisions of the London conference in the interest of peace in this part of the world and the abolition of sanctions against our country," we read in conclusion.

Panic Accepts 'Well-Argued Criticism'

AU0209200592 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Interview with Prime Minister Milan Panic by Milos Milatovic on 2 September; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Milatovic] Mr. Prime Minister, could you please comment on today's statement by the Main Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia [on the initiative for the FRY Assembly to take a vote of confidence in the Federal Government] and the possibility of the Yugoslav Assembly taking off its agenda a vote of confidence in the government.

[Panic] In the last few days, I have received huge support in our country for our government and our actions from the people and the international community. However, the statement by the leadership of the ruling party is in my opinion acceptable and deserves support, particularly the call for the decisions of the London conference to be responsibly and thoroughly debated in the parliament, just as I discussed them yesterday on Radio and Television Belgrade.

In implementing the conclusions of the London conference, we need unity and immense energy to carry out all this and to above all stop the war in Bosnia, to lift the sanctions, and to return Yugoslavia to the international community on an equal footing. The government has the most responsibility in this respect. It needs help from everyone and particularly the deputies of the Federal Assembly. In my opinion, it is all the more important that the ruling party wants in a democratic and tolerant way to help my government in this. In this sense, I, of course, accept all well-intentioned and well-argued criticism.

Even though I am always stressing that I am not a politician, I know enough that everything in politics happens in accordance with interests—that is to say, both criticism and praise should be realistically interpreted. In my opinion, the support that is advocated outside parliament—that is, in an undemocratic way of fighting—is not acceptable to me.

I need criticism and praise, but most importantly I want the people to support me. Today, I read that 82 percent of Belgrade people support the position of our Yugoslav Government because of what I am advocating and what I am doing and to ensure that the discussion on my work is a contribution to the development of our democracy.

Cosic Opposition to Panic Vote Discussed

LD0209163492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1412 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 2 Sep (TANJUG)—President Dobrica Cosic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia today demanded of Socialist [Socialist Party of Serbia, Socijalisticka Partija Srbije, SPS] and Radical [Serbian Radical Party, Srpska Radikalna Stranka, SRS] deputies to reconsider their initiative to suggest to the Federal Parliament the discussion of a motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Milan Panic and his government.

In his letter to these parties' Deputies Clubs, President Cosic expressed dissatisfaction with the decision to question confidence in the government because, as he writes, this would result in unforeseeable consequences.

Cosic's letter to the SPS Deputies Club at the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is as follows:

"The responsibility vested in my duty gives me the freedom and right to address you with this letter.

"I regard your decision to demand, at this time, a motion of no confidence in the federal government and its prime minister, Milan Panic, as hasty, politically damaging, and traditional, in manner and tone, in the negative sense of the word.

"I am of the opinion that you should have been duty-bound in keeping with good and democratic manners to brief me in my capacity as president of the Republic on your intention, and consult me, because it was I who gave, following your suggestion but also following my belief, Mr. Milan Panic his prime-ministership designate, so I hope that you do not expect me to carry out anyone's political will without my belief in it and follow you along the lines of some principle or interest.

"Despite his lack of familiarity with our situation—which, we must admit, people from abroad usually find hard to comprehend anyway—Prime Minister Milan Panic has accomplished significant results on the strength of his exceptional activities, his precious political energy, his loyalty to today's principal state aim—lifting the sanctions—his new style of conducting foreign policies, and his impressive communication skills.

"It is no exaggeration to say that he steered the FRY back onto the international political stage. He revealed the peaceful and democratic face of our condemned and isolated country. At a time of an economic, political, cultural, and sports blockade, at a time of threats of military intervention, Premier Milan Panic's political energy has exceptional significance regarding the lifting of sanctions, something that has a decisive effect on the future of the unification of Serbia and Montenegro.

"At the international conference on Yugoslavia held in London, our delegation achieved results which give us hope that we will be saved from these misfortunes that could be detrimental to our survival. The most important role in the delegation and its activities undoubtedly was played by Mr. Milan Panic. In his passion for quick success, he made some pointless statements and mistakes. But they were not such as to bring into doubt Panic's good intentions and his mandate.

"I have some criticism of the policies, methods, and style of work of Prime Minister Milan Panic: I told him about my disapproval of some of his political views and personal decisions, which he rationally accepted. Prime Minister Milan Panic and the federal government deserve to receive critical assessments and democratic pointers that some of their views should be reconsidered and tested in a public debate in the Federal Assembly.

"This is, in my view, all that is politically necessary to do at the moment.

"By passing a vote of no confidence in the federal government and prime minister, we would seriously jeopardize results achieved at the London conference and trust in the FRY's peaceful and democratic policies; a vote of no confidence in the government of Milan Panic would now jeopardize the seeds of our democratic and civic unity, which we achieved by intensifying the democratic transformation of our society; a vote of no confidence in the government of Milan Panic would, under existing circumstances encourage secessionist and conservative forces and would create more favorable conditions for these to achieve their aims. I do not even need to remind you of the necessity to have democratic unity and civic solidarity at a time when we are facing unforeseeable difficulties to survive under the conditions of isolation.

"I would like to end this letter, which is unpleasant for me and for you, with a plea and advice: check the stated policies of the federal government and Prime Minister Milan Panic; criticize Milan Panic and the federal government for domestic and foreign policy failures; propose ideas and pointers to them; but express political confidence and support in them so that they can carry out tasks of vital importance for our nation and the FRY.

"In hope that you will understand my motives and intentions, and accept my sincere respect." [passage omitted]

Party Leader Warns of Civil War if Panic Replaced

LD0209150492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1349 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Sep (TANJUG)—If Prime Minister Milan Panic is replaced on Friday, the world will severely tighten Serbia and Montenegro's isolation and the possibility of military intervention would again come to the fore; also, a civil war between democratic and fascist-communist forces would be inevitable in Serbia, Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renaissance Movement [SPO], told a news conference held at the international press center in Belgrade today.

The SPO will not organize demonstrations on Friday, when the Assembly will be deciding Panic's fate. We must teach our citizens not to expect political organizations to call them to defend their future. The time has come for them to be led by imminent danger and mayhem, Draskovic said, stressing that he will be in front of the Assembly "as a citizen of Belgrade" on Friday.

Calls For Pro-Panic Demonstrations

AU0209172192 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] The outcome of the London conference would have been far more difficult for us had it not been for Milan Panic's exceptional diplomatic activity and reasonable behavior on the international stage. This was stated at a news conference by Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement. Vladimir Nikolic reports:

[Begin Nikolic recording] The hope of Europe and the rest of the world that the war in Bosnia could be stopped primarily by diplomatic means without military intervention was awakened by Mr. Panic's announcement that he opposes the evil in Serbia and that he would settle accounts with the Serbian president and his policies. Precisely because of this, the Serbian president has decided to get rid of Panic, Draskovic said.

Cosic and Milosevic wanted to use Panic as a puppet in the game in the international arena, Draskovic said, and added that Panic had brought on this offensive with the arrest of the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, the closing of the currency printing presses in Topcider, the announcement of democratic elections, and the removal of Mihalj Kertes who is, according to Draskovic, the head of the secret political police.

Democratic Serbia cannot allow this showdown to be won by what Draskovic called Mafia politicians and war profiteers. If Panic is replaced, the world will drastically isolate Serbia and Montenegro, and civil war between democratic Serbia on the one side and the communist and fascist Serbia on the other would be possible.

Draskovic thinks that democratically inclined citizens will come to the Assembly building on Friday and express their opposition to the attempt to remove Panic. Asked whether he would lead these democratic forces, Draskovic said that democracy does not like leaders and that the Serbian Renewal Movement would not organize any demonstrations on Friday.

Nevertheless, Draskovic will come as a citizen to the Federal Assembly building. In this regard, he expressed his hope that the deputies from the Federal Assembly from Montenegro would have enough dignity and strength to prevent the replacement of Prime Minister Panic. [end recording]

Panic Discusses London Conference Issues

AU0109214392 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1822 GMT 1 Sep 92

[Interview with Prime Minister Milan Panic by Ratko Dmitrovic in Belgrade studio—live]

[Text] [Dmitrovic] Mr. Panic, are you here for the first time or have you been here before?

[Panic] I have been here before as a businessman.

[Dmitrovic] Now you are here as a prime minister. As you were a participant in the London conference, could you please assess it briefly from your point of view; was it successful or less successful, has it met your expectations, and the like?

[Panic] In my opinion, the London conference has done more than we had expected. I will tell you several points of what, in my opinion, was completed at that conference.

One of the important points is that the London conference was much more realistic in assessing responsibility for the war and the situation in the Balkans. Until now, Serbs have always been called the aggressors, the people who are to blame. Only Serbs have been blamed for everything that has happened in the Balkans and in Serbia, Croatia, and everywhere. This is the first conference at which, in my opinion, the situation was very balanced, and the international public started to believe that what we say can be true.

The other very important thing that resulted from this conference is that it has now been proven that it is not a religious war, that it has not [word indistinct]. Not for a moment was a religious war touched upon—Muslims against the Serbs, Serbs against... [pauses] Muslims against Serbs or Catholics, or Catholics against Protestants. This is a very important thing, because at the last conference, they were trying all the time—Muslims of course—to make it appear to be a religious war, so that they would probably involve this coalition that is called the Muslim coalition.

Of course, the most important point after this conference is that we (?arrived at the decision) that there will be no military intervention. I should present to you, to you all, something that I heard. It was not a secret, but I did not tell you because it was not very pleasant. When I was in Washington waiting to go to Belgrade to become prime minister-designate, I was told that it would be a matter of hours before the positions where tanks—where Serbian guns—were located around Sarajevo and shelled the airport were to be bombed. This was some time, I have forgotten, around 24 June approximately, or 27 June. The bombing was a very realistic possibility at that moment. It would have been a tragedy for us—but we were all fortunate—because it included Belgrade, bridges in Belgrade and our military positions such as Batajnica and the like. People told me that this would really happen and that it was just a matter of hours. That night, I spent the entire night trying to talk with Mr. Izetbegovic [president of Bosnia-Hercegovina]—to explain to him what will happen—and with Mr. Karadzic [president of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina]. Fortunately, we somehow managed to wake up Mr. Karadzic. I had never talked with him before. I thought that he did not know me, but he did know me. When he heard what was happening and the situation, in my opinion, we were in, he promised me that evening, that night, at 0400 hours, that he would do everything for the shelling of the airport to stop—the airport was being shelled then—so that airplanes could start landing. This was a very important turning point in the chances of bombing—including Belgrade—or not.

So, Izetbegovic and I did have contact, but not a direct one; we held talks via a fax machine and that was carried on their television.

[Dmitrovic] Mr. Prime Minister, just one question in connection with this bombing and the mention of Belgrade and bridges—who intended to carry out the bombing, the Americans or the United Nations?

[Panic] The United Nations.

[Dmitrovic] Without the permission of the Security Council?

[Panic] I do not know how. I still had not visited the United Nations then, so I do not know exactly (?who). I was only frightened of the fact that this possibility existed. I [word indistinct] thought that this would be a tragedy for us, for our policy, and for our future and I started to work the entire night, to do everything that I thought best to do—as when grasping at straws. I thought that it is the best to talk with Izetbegovic, Karadzic, and Boban, and, fortunately, I found Dr. Karadzic; that is, I woke him up.

The second thing, or rather the fourth thing that happened in London is that the conference came to the conclusion that all three peoples must negotiate. It was always said before that it is a Muslim state, it is one group, one (?ethnic group)—it is one, one, one. It has now been concluded that all three peoples must negotiate on an equal footing.

The other very important idea adopted was that we offered—the United Nations has never paid attention to that—we offered to give them control between Bosnia and Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Serbia. We have...

[Dmitrovic, interrupting] Have you asked for control between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia?

[Panic] [laughs] Of course, it is not just we who have (?gained). First, because they accused us of sending arms—and I told them, of course, that they do not need any because they have enough arms there for the next five years and factories to produce arms, they do not need anything and that we, that our government's policy is not to send arms—a few months, a month or two ago we asked the United Nations to set up border controls. They failed to do so. This time they agreed, but they agreed to include Bosnian and Croatian, Hercegovina, and Croatian borders. This is an addition to what is in the documents.

This is a very important thing. We learned something else that is very important. The only reason they do not have sanctions against Croatia, which usually is not known here, is because our Armed Forces—well, our Armed Forces—the armed forces of the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina are so much stronger than the Muslim forces that there would not be a military balance. This is the only reason and explanation I received as to why there were no sanctions against Croatia. So, for the first time we received control between Croatia and Bosnia, exactly as you asked.

The next thing, the next very important thing, is the camps. This received such media... [pauses] This was a fantastic media bomb for us. We had two or three weeks of what they call a honeymoon in the press in [word indistinct]. I was continually saying: There will be bombs, they are coming, they are coming. I did not even dream that someone could conceive of such a good one as concentration camps.

Of course, they first accused us of having concentration camps in Bosnia and then there were a few of those tragic pictures. That has all calmed down now, but in fact, they agreed that all camps must be closed and not just Serbian but also Bosnian and Croat camps. This is a very important point—that there was no difference between these three camps. This was a very important point.

Izetbegovic, in his speech, and of course [Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris] Silajdzic tried to create that old propaganda about aggressors; the Serbs as aggressors, aggressors, aggressors. Not one document says that the Serbs are aggressors. This brought to an end his idea to make out that the Serbs are aggressors, while they are wonderful and they are the ones who are suffering and the Serbs are the ones who are constantly doing this. This is the style of (?persuasion) or propaganda that Izetbegovic has. Izetbegovic not so much, but Silajdzic I think is the one I said was a used car salesman. He has created such propaganda. Of course, the aggressor was deleted from all documents.

The statement on Serbia and Montenegro, in some places it was called Yugoslavia—that is, Federal Yugoslavia—and in others Montenegro, was a very good thing. For the first time, they began to talk about Federal Yugoslavia and I will show a document or two. I think that it was ten times better than we could have expected. Ten times b[illegible] will explain why. We will go through this.

A very important point that we [illegible]ough and discussed was that Kosovo, Vojvodina, and the Sandzak are Yugoslavia's internal issues. There is no longer any question about whether they will separate as different nations or whether they will receive the right to do so. They were there and they were there only as visitors. They did not take part in the conference.

So, there is no longer any question, as our government—not our government, our Assembly—decided on 24 April that Yugoslavia's borders will be respected as the borders that were organized by AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia]. I called them Tito's borders and we will discuss later what this means.

So, Kosovo was Yugoslavia's internal affair. Of course, we discussed Kosovo regarding human rights and the laws that Serbia has perhaps passed and never applied, which I said should be scrapped, and such things.

[Dmitrovic] What laws are we talking about, Prime Minister?

[Panic] I do not know what these laws are. It was said that some laws were passed that have never been applied.

Zecevic, Mr. Zecevic—Bozovic [Serbian Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic], yes, Bozovic said, Bozovic said that these laws have not even been applied, and he agreed with me that these laws should be scrapped. It is not important whether a law has been applied or not applied. The important thing is that people saw these laws, translated them into 77 languages, and showed how they are discriminatory against Albanians. We of course have to hear these things. I did not agree with this but there was a lot of talk about human rights in Kosovo and of course human rights and Albanians.

Let me just tell you what I said about Albanians [in Kosovo] and Serbs in Albania. In my speech, I said that Yugoslavs of Albanian origin and Yugoslavs of Serbian origin are Yugoslav citizens, and since they are Yugoslav citizens they are my responsibility and the responsibility of my government and our state. One life of one Albanian—Yugoslav of Albanian origin—or Serb of Yugoslav origin is more important to me than all the books that have been written about human rights. They heard that quite clearly because they insist on coming here to teach us about human rights, as you know.

This was very important for them because we can expect a little more respect now from people abroad regarding human rights. I think that we must do this seriously in Yugoslavia.

There was one important feature at the conference, probably the most important feature. We write a lot of letters. I write hundreds of letters. This time I wrote a letter to the United Nations that contained the same points that I presented to the Assembly as regards to what the positions of our delegation would be in London. These letters usually find their way to some filing cabinets in the United Nations, no one reads them, we know that. But this time, to my surprise, in the opening speech by Mr. Major, who led the whole London Conference, he was the chairman, as we know, he said something like this.... This is the speech by Mr. Major at the conference....

[Dmitrovic] Well, Prime Minister, let's not go into detail....

[Panic] You did not hear. It is very important, just like the statement on principles, this should be accepted. This is the most important thing for us. We think that these principles that we wanted the conference to adopt are in line with my recent letter to the Security Council. This is very important. For the first time, our proposal was taken by the conference.

We always go somewhere to defend ourselves. This time we went there and they took our letter as the basis for the conference. Of course, he said that this should be done [words indistinct] and so on. I think that this was a fantastic breakthrough. This was the beginning for the conference to do something for us that it had never done before.

Of course, an even greater surprise was the speech after his by Minister Hurd, minister for foreign affairs. He said that Yugoslavia in general and Serbia in particular face a somber choice [preceding 11 words in English] and I should have this in Serbian but of course I did not. We have one condition to see that here.... [changes thought] we have two choices. One is to do things according to these 12 points we presented to the conference. Or, we have the other one and that is to be excluded and isolated from the entire world. Nothing more can be done than what we said in our [words indistinct]. He did not want us to do anything more than what we have given. At that moment, we were in a perfect situation. Our delegation was [changes thought] For the first time in the history of these negotiations, they accepted what we wanted, what the assembly endorsed—the 12 points—and then it turned into a conference for talking.

[Dmitrovic] Mr. Prime Minister,....

[Panic] OK, I will now listen [words indistinct].

[Dmitrovic] You mentioned this letter that was obviously appreciated and positively assessed at this conference. However, this letter had been sent considerably earlier, before the London conference. You had verbally presented the proposals contained in the letter even before you wrote that letter. I would like you to explain to us how you interpret the fact that the world is reacting completely differently to your pacifism, to the peace that you have been promoting, than could be expected. The same Mr. Hurd stated that Serbs will be freezing, Eagleburger stated that they will be without a smile on their faces, and the Germans are threatening to tighten the sanctions.

[Panic] I think, how should I put it, first I want to say something about the sanctions, the ones that we discussed at the conference. There was no talk at the conference about increasing sanctions against Yugoslavia. We did not even discuss this. What was said is that other states, other states that [words indistinct] to observe sanctions and that, if they had agreed in an international body such as the United Nations, they should be supporting sanctions. Of course, the countries mentioned are Greece, Romania, and some other countries. So, there was nothing else regarding the sanctions than what those people said, namely that if one decides to introduce sanctions, then one should maintain them.

Why are all these people saying this? I think that they are tired of us. We are making promises but not taking action. I think that it is high time for the Yugoslavs and the Serbs to start looking at their face as it is rather than the face they would like to see. Serbia and Yugoslavia are small countries. We must understand our position. We are not Russia or some other big country with the capacity to defend ourselves with economic or other resources. The people—the deal with those people who said that we have to learn what, why, what they want—they think that we are a potential cancer in Europe, that what is happening in Bosnia and what we failed to

control can spread to other countries. Of course, they do not like that. This is why they are against this.

In this process we attended some 10 to 15 conferences, we signed 60 agreements, but we have never kept our word. We always say that the other side is responsible. We always say it is somebody else's fault. Serbs have never said: Sorry, we made a mistake. This is not the Serbian way. It would be much better, much better, if in these negotiations we occasionally admitted that we made a mistake. We have never said it, not even a single time. This is our way of negotiating, which I do not think is good. If you make a mistake, you should admit it. I think that they did not require anything more from us than what they expected. [sentence as heard] This has to do with these 12 points. If we carry out these 12 points [words indistinct] say to Serbia and Montenegro. This was the first time that we did not talk about the sanctions. I made a 20-minute speech against sanctions and what we did to remove the sanctions.

My policy, and the policy of our government has been: we do not want to fight the sanctions, we do not want to say that the entire world is against us, since I do not believe in that. I think that the sanctions were introduced not because the world hates us, but because we made mistakes. I do not believe that Yugoslavia disintegrated because foreigners arranged it, because we did not have a leader here who could create a Yugoslavia. Of course, there are certain interests involved here, but there are always capable leaders who can put all these interests together. For instance, when I complained about what they are doing in Serbia and Bosnia, and why Mr. Eagleburger was behaving in the way he was, he openly asked me: Why were you not here when we supported you, when we supported Yugoslavia, when we were looking for a leader who could take care of the situation so that we could have a stable situation in the Balkans? There was no such man. When we were looking for such a man we could not find him. He said: You, Panic, did not come to tell us that we were right. He then said: Now you complain so much. I told him that I expected the U.S. officials to do the things the way they should be done. If they do not, then I will go there to tell them that. This was [words indistinct].

In fact, the most important thing that (?you) and all Yugoslavs that are watching this program should hear is: We have a chance, they told us in the final address. Everything will be fine for us if, as has been suggested in the recent letter from me to the president of the UN Security Council, Serbia and Montenegro fulfill these obligations in deed and in words, since we have not dones so, you have to admit it, as I admit it. Then we will regain the respectful position in the international community, return to the UN headquarters, and attain the rest of what we are fighting to get. People normally fight for what they do not have.

Serbia and Montenegro will then be able to trade—sanctions will be lifted—to receive aid and enjoy the full cooperation of all the members of the international community. This could not have worked out better. This took our delegation—some of those who worked in the delegation, as there were 60 of us and 15 did work, and the rest of them not only did not work but did not even applaud when we succeeded, and some even worked against us—so understanding all this, the world has given us a chance to fulfill all these things and become part of the international community. But they say, if we do not do it, then the Security Council will be asked to impose strict sanctions that will lead to total international isolation. What does this mean? We have a chance to become part of the world with pride, as we used to be, even when Yugoslavia was a joint state, to be part of the international society with all the privileges that come with being part of society, to become a society where the economic order, closer to the European one, can become a matter of planning. In several years, we could have a Western-style standard of living—we know what the Yugoslav standard of living is—where having an apartment is not a problem, everybody has an apartment, where there is so much work, more work than there are people to do it, so you have to look hard to get the best worker. We want to create such a situation; to create a situation where we have an economic system that gives us the most important thing—economic freedom. Only when a man is economically free can he be politically free. The world is giving us that.

Now the most important thing, if we do not achieve this freedom, then we have isolation, inflation, speculation—which could not be greater here—black market, manipulation, as I call it, an even worse standard of living, more unemployed, university and student problems, all kinds of possible problems. I think, since I was the first prime minister to visit Albania in the history of Yugoslavia, that we end up like Albania. That is what will happen, in my opinion, if we do not do what needs to be done.

[Dmitrovic] Mr. Prime Minister, let us go back to the main issue. You have been accused by the initiators of the no-confidence vote of deviating significantly from the decisions of the assembly made at the session just before the London conference. Please, without too much elaboration, tell us in what way you deviated from these decisions.

[Panic] First, I do not think that I deviated from the FRY Assembly conclusions at all. Second, I want to tell you that the 12 points that were part of my letter and my speech in the Assembly—although perhaps they were not made at the same time, but my peace plan has always been the same, they, it happened, conference [as heard, changes thought] we worked at a big conference, but a lot is done behind closed doors. Then Mr. Milosevic and I were invited to sit with Mr. Lord Carrington—he called me the apparent prime minister, and I called him the apparent Lord, and we quickly became friends—he invited Mr. Milosevic and me to talk behind closed doors with witnesses, for example, Mr. (?Olic) was there...

[Dmitrovic] All right, that is less important.

[Panic] It is not important. Then he took my letter, to my astonishment, my letter to the United Nations, and started asking Mr. Milosevic whether he agreed with point one. Mr. Milosevic said yes. Do you agree with point two? No. He did not like some of the words in point two. Mr. Milosevic agreed with all 12 points, and said that two of them were excellent. That is why I do not think there was any disagreement.

[Dmitrovic] One of the disputed elements—you will explain why—is a signature on some document that was offered by President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. You were allegedly ready in London—they accuse you of this—to recognize Tito's borders, to deliver the Serbs in the Krajinas to Zagreb's jurisdiction, to return Prevlaka, which opens the following situation...

[Panic] That is too many questions. Can you ask one?

[Dmitrovic] All right, later then.

[Panic] Let us start with the recognition of Croatia. There is a chance, if we understand international politics and Yugoslavia's international situation, that we might be thrown out of the UN, out of all international organizations. They have started to exert pressure. If my government had not sent one letter to the CSCE, we would have lost the seat, but they have kept it for us, only we cannot occupy it. You have heard about that. There was one letter that was sent at midnight one night.

We have our pride, to return the nation to the international situation and to the United Nations, for example. The Yugoslav Assembly had made a decision to recognize the borders before I became prime minister. I think on 24 and 27...

[Dmitrovic, interrupting] What borders?

[Panic] The AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders.

[Dmitrovic] The Yugoslav Assembly?

[Panic] The Yugoslav Assembly on 24 June, I do not know the exact date. [sentence as heard]

[Dmitrovic] I do not remember such a decision being made.

[Panic] Well, you can look it up.

[Dmitrovic] Regarding Croatia, certainly not.

[Panic] They made a decision to recognize the AVNOJ borders. Of course, there was this question about Krajina. We all live [word indistinct], and we know that this problem exists, and Prevlaka, too. As for Krajina, we have to recognize all these countries because we agreed to recognize them. We started with Slovenia. Unfortunately, we got nothing in return. If we recognize all these countries, then we can automatically, I have been told, we can keep our position in the United Nations.

It was very important to start the process of negotiating. I believe in peace. I do not just talk about it. I really do believe in peace. I want to negotiate with Gligorov. I have been with him, negotiating, several times. I held talks with Tudjman in Helsinki—everyone knew about that—and now I talked with him, not at any secret meetings, but in the ordinary, big circle where everyone was standing. We were talking, and his people came to me, since they knew that we had discussed the possibility of peace in Helsinki and what the situation was. I said that I was ready to talk about it, of course, but then something a bit strange happened. Tudjman came and asked who was supposed to start. I said, you start. That is a matter of agreement. I told him: Write down what you want first, then I will read what you want, and then I will do what I want. So we can start negotiating.

[Dmitrovic] Was that the only thing?

[Panic] We were sitting at lunch—no secret conference, nothing happened, no agreement, I just wanted to see his position, which I should not talk about, as Mr. Tudjman will probably see it—I just wanted to see what he wanted. That is my way of negotiating, as you probably have yours when you go shopping for a suit. Do you want to pay the full price, or do you ask for a discount? Prices are always fixed here. So he did that. We had lunch—Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Tudjman, Cosic, Cyrus Vance, and all the heads of the delegations; we all had lunch together. This document appeared at that lunch, his first proposal. I told him that it should be on one page only, and the Germans, French, English and Russians had to agree to it.

[Dmitrovic] And the Serbs.

[Panic] The Serbs, of course. The Serbs, they even said, not only the Yugoslavs, but the Serbs, Milosevic, as a Serb, then Bulatovic as a Montenegrin, since we are still not entirely recognized. I am the prime minister of Yugoslavia, which is sometimes recognized, sometimes not. In fact, it is recognized. Why else would they keep inviting us everywhere?

[Dmitrovic] How did they react to that document?

[Panic] Okay. The reaction to that document was tragic, because nobody knew what the document was. It was only one page. I now knew Mr. Tudjman's position, exactly what he wanted. I did not agree with it; I was not for it or against it, nor did I sign it. The thing was to take that one page and work on one thing at a time. I spoke about that page with the president of Krajina, on the plane after that, and he agreed with me that my position—I say if I got it, because we did not sign anything—if I got that position, that it would be good for Krajina. Of course, we would never sign such an agreement without the last point, which would say that the agreement had to be ratified by the Yugoslav Assembly. Of course, that is how agreements are made. That is not an accusation, that is, what do you call it, it is a small manipulation, what I did or did not do.

[Dmitrovic] Journalists reported that you were ready to sign that document.

[Panic] Of course, I was ready to sign a document about which nobody knew in Yugoslavia, like the lifting of the sanctions, for example. Without asking anyone.

[Dmitrovic] At what cost?

[Panic] At no cost. If they give me this for nothing I would take it. If they say we are lifting the sanctions, and you, Mr. Panic, sign here, you do not have to do anything, I would accept this. I would not ask anyone. There is an old custom here that everyone has to ask everyone else what to do, even if you are the best. If the one who is scoring goals in a soccer match had to stop to ask his manager whether he can shoot the ball, then he would never score a goal. The same happens in the diplomatic service. One must be capable and know his limitations. One must not, I would never make an agreement. [sentence as heard] Those who know me know that I do not give away something for nothing. I said that I would not give a single centimeter of Serbia away. If that agreement were made in the way it should have been, we would have gotten three times more than they ever dreamed of getting, in my view.

Do you know why? Because I made thousands of agreements. If you look at my agreements, I have sound experience in making agreements. (?In comparison with me) Tudjman, I do not know whether he is competition for me, he is probably a better general then I am, but in making agreements, I somehow feel (?more comfortable), better than he does.

[Dmitrovic] Have you ever done business with the Croats, Mr. Prime Minister?

[Panic] Ever?

[Dmitrovic] Have you ever done business with the Croats?

[Panic] Ever?

[Dmitrovic] Yes.

[Panic] Of course. We were selling goods to Krka, I am in the pharmaceutical industry....

[Dmitrovic, interrupting] That is Slovenia.

[Panic] ...to Pliva.

[Dmitrovic] Okay, Mr. Prime Minister, let us now return to...

[Panic, interrupting] This agreement [changes thought] there were no negotiations. This (?was) an agreement. We never held (?secret) conferences. I do not know how this appeared in the press and why this was proclaimed...

[Dmitrovic, interrupting] Did there...

[Panic] ...but if I could make peace with Croats, I want to tell you, this is my goal, I would like to do it. This does not mean that those in Krajina [changes thought] for instance, the thing that has never been discussed, I hope that Mr. Tudjman will not change his mind, I told him we have to add another thing, whatever we do, I want all Yugoslavs in Krajina, Serbs in Krajina to be able to have Yugoslav citizenship. [sentence as heard] Tudjman looked at me and asked me: Could the Croats then have the same in Yugoslavia? Of course. He then said: That would not be bad. This means that the people who live in Krajina, if they ever become part of Croatia under Vance's plan, as we have agreed at the previous conference, should, in my view, have dual citizenship.

Where did this come from? One can have dual citizenship in the United States and Yugoslavia. This is why I said that after a year or two, if they want, they can be citizens of Yugoslavia. If all these systems change into democratic systems, one day people will choose where they want to live not with rifles, but at elections. This must be understood.

[Dmitrovic] The principle of self-determination.

[Panic] Of course.

[Dmitrovic] Mr. Prime Minister, in my view this playing around with Croatia's recognition is very dangerous for the following reason: I think that you know that Mr. Tudjman has filed charges against 30,000 Serbs, former citizens of the Republic of Croatia. Out of these 30,000 about 25,000 are in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In case of recognition of Croatia and if they are sentenced in Croatia, Yugoslavia would be obliged to hand these people over to Croatia.

[Panic] This would be out of the question. The nonsense that I heard now, if I were negotiating, would be out of the question.

[Dmitrovic] But, according to international law, Tudjman....

[Panic] I do not care about international law. If I were negotiating on behalf of Yugoslavia, I would not agree on this.

[Dmitrovic] Okay, let us turn to Kosovo, let us return to Kosovo. You met with Rugova [leader of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo], if my information from London is correct.

[Panic] This is correct.

[Dmitrovic] Did you meet him on your own, or was it a meeting between two delegations?

[Panic] I say again to our people that 10 to perhaps 60 percent of things at such conferences happen behind closed doors, if this was arranged by someone else. It is like the meetings we have spoken about, a dinner with Tudjman, Milosevic, Cosic. This is a small group.

Regarding Kosovo, I think that the secretary was there. Mr. Hurd called and asked me to meet the Kosovo

delegation. I brought with me several people, I do not remember who they were; one was, I think, Tosa Olic, my adviser, and several other people. I thought that this was a fantastic possibility. You only have minutes to decide. They call you, and you have to run there. This is not [charges thought] you (?cannot) hold a conference for three days, as you used to do here in the past, but it never solved anything. You have 20 seconds to decide whether to go or not. So, they asked me whether I wanted to meet with Rugova.

Why did I jump at that offer? I wrote him a letter. I tried to bring him in Belgrade to meet us. He did not want to do so. I wanted to establish contact with Kosovo political leaders. I believe that we must include Kosovo if we do not want to exclude them. I do not want to exclude them. This is out of the question for me. Kosovo is an integral part of Yugoslavia or Serbia. We must therefore work with them. We must somehow include them in our political system. This was my position. So, when Hurd, who is a very important man, told me that they arranged a meeting between me and my advisers with Mr. Rugova, I invited three or four people from our delegation. We then went to a room. Mr. Rugova came. I saw him for the first time.

He did not want to meet me before that. He did not want to meet anyone here. The Serbs have tried to work with him, I have tried to, he would not come. We have even tried to meet him in the presence of the Greeks. He would not come. This time they are inviting me to come, and, of course, I rush over to see them. I do not know if you know Professor Rugova and me.

[Dmitrovic] I do not.

[Panic] If you see him, he is a completely different man from me, in many ways. He is a professor, maybe even a philosopher, whatever, and, of course, these three, four professors from Kosovo, they told us straight away, in front of this English delegation—I think there was somebody else sitting there apart from the English—about the problems. And I, of course, told them, you are Yugoslavs, whether you like it or not, you can ask for whatever you want, that is your right, since I believe in democracy, but now you are Yugoslavs, and I will do all I can to include you in the Yugoslav political life. He says you cannot until you start doing something for us. What do you want to do? Hundreds of things. You know, when people start arguing, you should not get involved.

[Dmitrovic] So they had a long list.

[Panic] They did not have a long list, it is just that I was not interested. Usually this side says this, and if you start to listen to one side or the other, it is like a doctor who starts to believe the patient too much, psychologically, he becomes the patient.

[Dmitrovic] What is the essence of their demands?

[Panic] The essence of their demands, I think, has changed now. They arrived at the conference to get an independent Kosovo. But the success of our conference was that this is out of the question as far as the international community is concerned. That is now known. They know these positions. I think that is why they jumped at the chance to meet me. They have to see that they have to work with us. I think that they are now aware that those stories about the independence of Kosovo, a union with Albania, or whatever, that this will not happen. Because of that, they have to live with us now. Since they have to live with us, we have to sit at a table and start solving the so-called Kosovo question.

[Dmitrovic] But we have invited them four times.

[Panic] We have invited them 200 times, but they always thought that they could force us, with international pressure, to give them independence. Since we are such expert negotiators, we almost gave Kosovo independence. The success of this conference is that they did not get it. Because I believe that they should not get it, and we worked in such a style—maybe, as you say, I did not have the permission from the assembly to use that style, to keep Kosovo, since we did not discuss it at all—Kosovo is part of Serbia. The most important thing now is how we can get them into our political system, and how we can get them to become Yugoslavs, since they are Yugoslav citizens. He only happens to be an Albanian, but he is a Yugoslav. But I think that we have to make a plan—if there are such laws, if they exist and I think they do, as I asked Mr. Varadi, our justice minister, if such laws exist, since I do not know much about law, and he said yes—to change these laws immediately, because Mr. Bozovic told me that they were not implemented at all, although everyone talks about them. Laws, for example, on, I cannot remember, there are many laws, legal things.

[Dmitrovic] Prime Minister, you promised them that they would have their university.

[Panic] Not only that. We want to open all schools.

[Dmitrovic] But that university is already functioning, Prime Minister. No doubt about that.

[Panic] I have heard that it is. Yesterday, I even met Yugoslavs and Serbs from Kosovo, what I said and what was done differently to what I said [as heard]. This group appeared, I do not know how it happened that they appeared on the very day that the assembly is in session, to discuss me and the democratic system. The democratization process will probably clean it up a bit. One day it will not happen...

[Dmitrovic] It is their right to appear when they want.

[Panic] Absolutely, but not on the day that the Assembly discusses me. Don't laugh too much. Democratization, you think that everyone is stupid. Or you are too naive.

[Dmitrovic] Who do you mean when you say you, Prime Minister?

[Panic] Those who think that the whole world will see it as an absolute case.

[Dmitrovic] You sound as if you are referring to the Serbs. Then it sounds non-ethnic, as if you are not a Serb.

[Panic] I am not saying that I am talking about the Serbs. I am only saying this to us. Especially to those who are so naive and so stupid that they think that they can do such things for the whole world without anyone knowing about it.

I was talking to a student, an intelligent student. We were talking about democracy and I listened to more than asked questions. We first of all have to teach people to come here and ask questions. People do not do that, they make speeches. Everyone makes speeches about Kosovo as though I do not know what Kosovo is and that the battle of Kosovo was in 13.... and what happened and that this is our cradle and so on. All of them make speeches.

Then I listened to tragedies about ethnic cleansing, tragedies about a lot of things, and of course you have to listen because this is the Yugoslav style. It is good to listen but not too much, especially when they start repeating themselves. That starts to bother me because I do not have time for such things. They say that in politics you have to be patient. As you will remember, when I was in the Assembly, they talked about the same thing for five hours, everyone repeated the same thing.

Then I spoke to some of our people and said that the Assembly should probably change this in our democratic process. You have to have a sense of responsibility. You have rights, that is one thing. You have to be responsible. A hundred people sit there and listen constantly to the same speeches.

What happened with these Serbs from Kosovo. It happened that they also do not know what democracy is. They want democracy for themselves but not for the Albanians. That is very important. If you want to speak Serbian in Kosovo and have a democratic system in Yugoslavia, you have to allow these people to speak whatever language they want. This is the first element of democratization.

I said when I was asked in California, and this is very important, probably because of three Serbs or Yugoslavs in California who made a great fuss over the Serbo-Croatian language [changes thought] the most important permit or legitimation in California is your driving license. That is everything for you. That shows who you are, that is your passport to travel. You can even come from America to Europe and if you do not have a passport you can use your driving license as a passport.

Believe it or not, these people cannot understand that you can sit and take an examination in Serbo-Croatian in California. That probably costs California several million dollars, because the Serbs were shouting this is a rich country and then they gave this money. So, you can have an examination in Serbo-Croatian in California.

[Dmitrovic] But Serbo-Croatian cannot be an official language in California....

[Panic] Of course not.

[Dmitrovic] ....just as Albanian cannot be an official language here and they want that, Prime Minister.

[Panic] No, of course not, no, no. They can [word indistinct]. They want to. I think that we have [changes thought] Democracy will not be born in Serbia. If you think that you will make democracy that means that you will [changes thought] since I am bringing democracy, I am beginning to teach the democratic system.

I think that it is a very important thing that it is understood that people have had all these problems. This is not a new problem that a minority in a state wants its own language. In California, again, they want Spanish. So, what do we do? We allow them to have a university in Spanish. Then, we explain that this is not good economically for them because the language of the state is English. It is not good economically because if a person only speaks Spanish, they have fewer employment opportunities than if they speak good English, especially when it comes to specializations.

That is my reason why Albanians should speak Serbian and this is not because they have to speak Serbian. Their reason that the university should be Serbian must be economical because really if they want an Albanian university—you can have whatever university you want—in a democracy you have to allow them to create such a university. Perhaps you do not help them with a lot of money and perhaps it would even be a private university. It could be in any language you want. We must understand that the democratic system is that you must appreciate the rights and demands of other people just as you want them to respect yours.

If I want them to respect the Serbian language then we must respect the Albanian language. If there are a lot of them who want an Albanian university I do not see a reason why they should not be allowed to have an Albanian university. They can have as many as they want, they can have ten universities.

[Dmitrovic] But there is an Albanian university in Tirana for example.

[Panic] We are a big country. I was in Yugoslavia. We want to spread democratization. We are talking about democratization, privatization. We are a different country from Albania. I visited Albania, I could tell you a few things.

[Dmitrovic] Have you discussed and tried to resolve the position of Albanians in Yugoslavia with Albanian President Berisha?

[Panic] I never...

[Dmitrovic, interrupting] You have never stated that? This information appeared in the press, that you said that you would try to sort it out with Berisha.

[Panic] We have problems with our press.

[Dmitrovic] They report things that you have not said?

[Panic] Of course. I have never met Berisha, nor have I ever spoken to him. What was the question about? Forget about Berisha. I have been in Albania, and I have spoken to other people, I cannot remember who, what was the question. You asked me...Forget about Berisha.

[Dmitrovic] We were talking about the university.

[Panic] The Albanians negotiated with us exactly the way it was done during the Cold War. They kept repeating the same thing. They changed nothing. I bombarded them with lectures.

[Dmitrovic] To no avail?

[Panic] Absolutely none. The old communist line is sitting there, and nothing is changing. They do not laugh, they just repeat the same thing, and when you say something, they again repeat the same, and so on. I think that we have a problem of democratization. However, I can tell you one thing: It could be worse, like in Albania.

[Dmitrovic] Mr. Prime MInister, and this is the impression one gets from the press, let us go back to the press—you say that it is not reliable, but we have to go back to the press—is there a conflict between you and President Milosevic? Those who say that there is base it on the fact that you have stated that, if Mr. Milosevic cheats on the London document, you will insist on his resignation, that he should not get in your way, and so on. Do you have doubts that Mr. Milosevic might not respect the London decisions? Is there really a conflict between you two?

[Panic] First of all, you have just asked me a pile of questions.

[Dmitrovic] There I go again with my questions. Let us have these two.

[Panic] One at a time.

[Dmitrovic] First....

[Panic] As far as the agreement in London is concerned, Mr. Milosevic went through all the points, just like I did. He agreed in front of Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance to....

[Dmitrovic, interruping] We have time. [video shows Dmitrovic looking at clock]

[Panic] He [not further identified] said 30 minutes.

[Dmitrovic] We have time.

[Panic] You got me [word indistinct].

[Dmitrovic] Just go ahead. Time flies, Mr. Prime Minister.

[Panic] That is true. You are looking at the clock. If you do not have any more time....

[Dmitrovic] No, no, just carry on.

[Panic] I think it is very important for the Yugoslav people to understand my position. It is not important because of me, since I am not important, but there will be other prime ministers, and I hope that I will leave them something to build upon. Because if that does not happen, there will be no foundations for the democratization of this country. It does not exist now, I know it. That is why I have spent a lot of time [changes thought] so I hope that I can create the foundations for the democratization of Yugoslavia, which is so very important, and for economic development, and privatization and mutual respect. The press should show more respect to one another.

As for Mr. Milosevic, I have to tell you that he agreed with all 12 points of my letter, so how can there be a disagreement? Questions keep arising abroad about Mr. Milosevic not keeping his word. This has to be openly said to the world, we have to start at home, and that is why they ask me what I am going to do if he does not keep his promise. I say, since I signed it, when I sign something, and I have signed many contracts, in business you only have one chance to sign or not to sign, then the bank does not give you a second chance. So I have learned that when you sign a contract you have to stick by it. Reporters ask me: What are you going to do if Milosevic breaks his promise? The same as with all the others, I said. If he is a clerk, I will dismiss him, and if he is a politician, I will ask him to resign. That is all I said. I want everyone to know. If Mr. Milosevic does not keep his word, which he and I gave together, as representatives of the Yugoslav and Serbian peoples, I will ask him to submit his resignation.

[Dmitrovic] Is there any difference in the views he and you....

[Panic] That is very democratic, I think, and if he sees, as he probably has seen that I have made some mistakes with this conference in London, and if he thinks that I am no good, then he can create a political situation so that people think I am not a patriot. First of all, I do not fight for patriotism: I am a patriot. I do not strive to be a greater or lesser patriot. There is a lot of talk here about who is a greater or lesser communist. I have said that we have to forget about that.

[Dmitrovic] Or an anti-communist?

[Panic] Or an anti-communist. That is the most fashionable thing here in Yugoslavia. We have to put a stop to that. But we are starting an even worse trend: Who is a greater patriot? There has been plenty of talk about who is a greater communist or anti-communist. Now I can see a new style is coming into fashion: Who is a greater

patriot? We have to stop that. We all have to be patriots, equal patriots, not greater and lesser ones. I will do that for my country, and you will not, and so on. We are all equal patriots, which is a very important concept for Yugoslavia, and perhaps my contribution to our life. So, we have never argued, the two of us.

[Dmitrovic] So there is no conflict between you two over the Krajinas, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Panic] We have never even spoken about it. We have never had any problems when we spoke to each other.

[Dmitrovic] There have been no opposing views?

[Panic] Absolutely not.

[Dmitrovic] Mr. Prime Minister, there has been some speculation about the defense minister appointment. One rumor is that you will bring in an American of Yugoslav origin. A particular name has been mentioned. Can you say now if there is any truth in it.

[Panic] Of course, you can see that I am ready for you, I am ready because I tell the truth. So, the answer to that one is no. But what did we (?say)? Let me tell you about something, since you did not ask me?

[Dmitrovic] Fine.

[Panic] You did not ask me about Prevlaka.

[Dmitrovic] I asked you, but you did not answer.

[Panic] You said....

[Dmitrovic] There were too many questions.

[Panic] Twenty-two questions about Prevlaka. We should talk about it. We (?made) a plan for Prevlaka. First of all, I did not know what Prevlaka was, which is very good. I even said that it would be good if we forgot history a bit. We somehow want to prove that everything we want to do today is good because of history. I think that we should start forgetting this dogma that history is the only thing that puts responsibility on us. There are other than historical criteria that can make us good Yugoslavs and good Serbs.

Prevlaka is now very important to Yugoslavia for technical reasons. I think that this is where the defense minister comes from [Panic corrects himself] I think that this is where the question for the defense minister comes from. Prevlaka is very important. I saw this on the map. When Tudjman asked me about what I thought about Prevlaka, I told him that I did not know what it was. He told me not to joke. I really did not know what Prevlaka was. Tosa Olic (?said that I did not know it). He said that Panic was not interested in it since he was not interested in borders. He is interested in other things, such as the international situation concerning Yugoslavia.

So, this time I, of course, knew everything about Prevlaka that I should know. Mr. Panic [chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff] prepared everything for me and, I am ready to discuss Prevlaka, if it came to reaching some agreement.

Of course, they were prepared for the fact that Prevlaka must be ours. There was not much talk about it. One possibility was that Prevlaka would become part of the United Nations, a small part of it....

[Dmitrovic] A neutral zone.

[Panic] A neutral zone (?of) the United Nations. When I go to Prevlaka this time, I will take a U.S. general, probably a retired one, because I want him to write down and confirm that this has nothing but military value for Yugoslavia, so that we can say at negotiations in the United Nations with the Croats that Prevlaka should not only be neutral but should belong to Yugoslavia.

So, I changed my view from favoring a neutral Prevlaka under UN supervision to a Yugoslav Prevlaka. Mr. Tudjman has probably heard this now. I am giving you now the details of issues that I am supposed to be negotiating. One should never negotiate in the media and I am probably losing my negotiating positions with him. I hope that I will gain something else, however.

[Dmitrovic] To bring this conversation slowly to a conclusion, I would also like you to comment on the draft bill on amnesty.

I do not know whether you saw this evening's news program. The General Staff has issued a statement in which it took the side of those who claim that this bill should not be adopted because the next mobilization could not be carried out. There are also those who claim that the bill should be adopted. Your government has proposed the bill.

[Panic] Yes. I, as defense minister, have some ideas as to what our Army should be like. Your listeners and viewers should perhaps hear them. I think that our Army should be a professional one. I think that our officers and soldiers should be working under different conditions. For example, they should be paid. Whether you believe it or not, we have problems with providing apartments for officers. How can we keep up the morale of the Army when we do not have apartments for them? How can we keep up the morale of the Army if we are not paying them anything? How can we do that when we have the problem of those who are doing things that they should not?

In my conversation with General Zivota Panic and others, I came to the conclusion that the best thing we have in Yugoslavia, believe it or not, is our Army. I even offered our Army to the United Nations to work for peace, since it was said that it was not good and that all these things are tragic. I have already received the first sign, the first diplomatic sign, that the United Nations may take the Yugoslav Army, because its members know the language, know the terrain, geography, and the situation in Bosnia. They could use the Yugoslav Army

as the UN peace-keepers. This is a possibility. This would be a total turnabout from what has been said about the Yugoslav Army. I hope that I contributed to this.

I am telling you, too, that the best thing we have today is the Army. The Army is something we can count on. So, Prevlaka must remain....

[Dmitrovic] No, the amnesty bill.

[Panic] The amnesty bill. I am not [changes thought] I cannot remember when we exactly discussed this in the government, whether this was done at the sessions that I attended or past sessions that I did not attend. I told the Yugoslavs that I would spend 80 percent of my first 100 days in office traveling abroad to restore our international pride, which I think has already been restored. Therefore, I do not remember when this was discussed.

I will tell you about this amnesty in general. We had the Vietnam War when people did not want to go to fight. I want to tell you that I was against that war, but I was not [changes thought] I was a reservist, I am no longer even that. So, I believe that amnesty is something that should be done. I am not acquainted with the particulars of our amnesty. In the United States, the military is paid, and it is not important whether you are getting new conscripts or not. I hope that one day we will be paying our soldiers and that there will be no conscripts. This is my aim. I want to see a plan for this one day. I think that this bill, I do not know the details of the bill, may be good, may not be good. Sometimes amnesty also includes criminals. They should not be part of it. I cannot discuss that.

[Dmitrovic] Mr. Prime Minister, we have now been talking for an hour. I thank you very much for coming here, for being a guest in the studio of Serbian television.

[Panic] I hope that our viewers now know exactly what my views are. I think that your questions were good. I think that they understand that they have two choices. One is peace, international recognition, pride, international law, consideration, and respect. The other is tragedy.

So, the Yugoslav people should decide what it wants. Thank you very much.

[Dmitrovic] Thank you very much, Prime Minister.

Esteemed viewers, this was Federal Prime Minister Milan Panic. Thank you for your attention and good night.

Sandzak Muslim Leader Comments on Panic Role

AU0209192992 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Sulejman Ugljanin, president of the Sandzak Party of Democratic Action, held a news conference today. Here is Novi Pazar radio reporter Bisera Vukasinovic with the details:

[Begin recording] Those who harbor evil intentions regarding Mr. Panic want to ruin the Serbian people, Ugljanin said, expressing personal sympathy for Prime Minister Panic as a person with new Western models. He did not miss the opportunity to once again recall how the Party of Democratic Action does not recognize the new Yugoslavia or its prime minister.

However, danger do not lie in Panic, Ugljanin added, but in those who brought him in, particularly Dobrica Cosic, who the leader of the Party of Democratic Action described as one of the authors of the Serbian national program. Mr. Panic was tricked because apart from the role of prime minister he has also been given that of defense minister, Ugljanin stated. If he is replaced, the Army will be without a defense minister and would be able to do what it wanted and that means continuing to provoke conflicts. In this respect, he claimed that it was now time for the occupation of the Sandzak, Kosovo, and Vojvodina.

The world knows that the Serbian national program foresees ethnically cleansing the Sandzak of Muslims, Bosnia-Hercegovina of Muslims and Croats, and Kosovo of Albanians. Fortunately this will not be allowed even though the so-called Yugoslavia has momentarily avoided military intervention. This was said today by Sulejman Ugljanin commenting on the latest events in the wake of the London conference. He expressed pleasure for having attended this gathering, but also regretted that the conference failed to found an international court for war crimes, and in fact pardoned the aggressor. [end recording]

Vice President Expects Early Assembly Election

LD0209152492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1404 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Sep (TANJUG)—Federal Vice President Radoje Kontic today told participants in roundtable talks between the authorities and opposition at the federal level that Federal President Dobrica Cosic insists that the law on the election of deputies to the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly be adopted by 20 September.

We assume that early elections will be called between 20 and 25 September, Kontic said, and he cautioned that the failure to reach agreement on the new electoral law could bring about serious political consequences.

In spite of this, by the time of this morning's break, the deadlock at the talks had not been broken because the representatives of 21 opposition parties insisted on a proportional system while the Socialist Party of Serbia was demanding a plurality system.

Prior to the debate, the participants were addressed by Federal Prime Minister Milan Panic, who expressed his hope that the authorities and opposition will reach an agreement that will facilitate truly free, democratic, and legitimate elections.

Minister Notes Draft Dodging; Amnesty Considered

LD0109173792 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1216 GMT 1 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Sep (TANJUG)—The Federal Assembly's committees for defense and security concluded at a session today that the passage of the law on amnesty for those who do not heed draft papers should be postponed.

Members of these two committees were unanimous that the law should be considered part and parcel of a package of laws on the Yugoslav Army and defense, that its author should amend the law, and that the law should be endorsed through regular, not emergency, procedure.

Justice Minister Tibor Varadi submitted a report on the draft law on amnesty. He stressed that a sufficient reason for endorsing this law is the fact that about 10,000 or even several hundred thousand people have refused to do their military duty. According to him, it would be impossible to bring criminal charges against all of them, and it would also be impossible to decide whom to prosecute.

JRB Director Comments on Danube Shipping Ban

92BA1355A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Blagoje Komljenovic: "The Danube Without Our Ships"]

[Text] The fleet of the JRB [Yugoslav River Shipping Company] is anchored in the winter anchorage of the ports in Belgrade, Pancevo, and Smederevo, although the summer days are very hot. Only a fifth of the approximately 300 vessels are cruising on the Danube, but exclusively in our section of this central European river, over a length of 588 km. The reason for this is the arbitrary tightening of the sanctions of the UN Security Council (Resolution 757, dated 30 May) by the Danube countries, above all Romania, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. They have simply prohibited vessels flying the Yugoslav flag to enter the Danube ports of those states, although the strict sanctions do not envisage that.

"We have neither violated, nor do we intend to violate the provisions of Resolution 757," says Dusan Strugar, JRB director. "We have been furnishing transportation services to third countries, the former Yugoslav republics of Macedonia, B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], and even Croatia. This is an additional punishment, a unilateral punishment that hurts us very much. We have been realizing a fourth of our revenues carrying cargo for third countries."

Excluded From International Waters

It is interesting that these countries on the Danube decided to exclude the Yugoslav flag from their waters in June, that is, two months after the sanctions of the Security Council were introduced. Why? Suspicion that prohibited goods were being delivered to the Serbs and Montenegrins has been expressed in the foreign press, which for a long time has been conducting an unprecedented propaganda campaign against the new Yugoslavia. The threat has even been made that warships of the American 6th Fleet will enter the Danube if necessary.

"The 6th Fleet, what are they talking about?" Strugar asks. "The waters of this river may not be entered by the warships of any country through which the Danube does not flow. That is stated explicitly in Article 30 of the Danube Convention, signed in Belgrade way back in 1948."

Our shippers are seeking the right interpretation for this additional penalty. After all, that blockade has practically excluded us from the company of the eight Danube countries, and the consequences are disastrous: The JRB plan for July and August is being fulfilled at only 20 percent. Yugoslavia is the leader on the Danube in tanker fleet (to carry petroleum and petroleum products); it has a greater capacity than all seven of the other states on its banks taken together.

That is why services to third countries with JRB tankers (with a capacity of 100,000 metric tons) have brought the greatest revenues to our river shippers.

The Danube is an international river, which is to say that ships may navigate it under all flags. Every domicile country is required to maintain the waterways and make them safe. Yugoslavia still holds that obligation in spite of the expulsion of our vessels from the waters of other states, and that costs quite a bit. Especially maintenance of the ship locks at the two Djerdap dams, which runs into millions of dollars.

A Tax Until the Blockade Is Lifted

"We have proposed to the competent ministry of the Serbian government that a special tax be introduced for the vessels of countries which do not allow our transit cargo to be transshipped in their ports," Dusan Strugar says. "For the present, this refers to Romania, Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. That charge would be in effect so long as the sanctions last. That is the only way of obtaining funds to maintain the waterways in our section of the Danube and to offset to some extent the loss from the unnecessary paralysis of the domestic fleet."

It is of interest that Germany is not one of those countries. The Germans are not more liberal, on the contrary. Back on 26 December of last year Chancellor Kohl's government prohibited all forms of transportation with Yugoslavia. This time, obviously, it is a question of a subsequent tightening of the measures of Resolution 757 on the basis of disinformation and without a request from the United Nations, which has exclusive jurisdiction over tightening or loosening the noose that has been put around our neck.

All of this, once again, is taking place on the eve of opening the Main-Danube Canal (25 September), when considerably more vessels with a variety of flags than at present will be sailing the shortest waterway from Rotterdam to Constantsa (3,505 km in length). We have met almost all the requirements set by the Security Council that preceded the political and economic blockade of Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Milan Panic informed the leaders of the United Nations of this the day before yesterday. That is why it would be more logical to lift the present barriers for our shippers instead of imposing new ones on them.

'Flying Ambassadors' in Foreign Service Viewed

92BA1336B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Aug 92 p 9

[Article by Spasenija Vujosevic: "'Flying Ambassadors' in the Service of Diplomacy"]

[Text] Instead of the conventional embassies and ambassadors with expensive residences and the sizable staff that goes with them, which we had in many places in the world, in the future modern, competent, and above all patriotically inclined "flying ambassadors" will be the pride of our diplomatic service. These ambassador-residents, as it is put in official language, will live in Yugoslavia, but will travel to "their" foreign country from time to time, only as necessary. In some cases, they will be ambassadors to several countries.

This will be only one of the forms of the reorganization of the diplomatic service of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], which is taking place in the federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs [MIP]. One thing is certain—the bell has certainly tolled for "our style" of conventional diplomacy, because not only our wealth but also our ties with the rest of the world have evaporated. Nevertheless, the old ambassadorial image, considerably updated and adapted to the needs of the new state, to be sure, will be retained in major world centers.

The End of the Life of Luxury

One and only one principle—the principle of optimum efficiency—will prevail in diplomacy for a long time yet, and everything will be subordinated to this.

Our clumsy, slow, luxurious, but also out-of-date diplomacy will have to adapt to the space and economic strength of the new state. Very quickly our diplomatic service will become a modern, efficient, competent, computerized, and dynamic diplomatic corps, it is explained in the federal MIP. Our diplomatic service, as they picturesquely put it, has to be "extricated from the baroque and the rococo."

Abilities More Important Than "Quotas"

They also say in the federal MIP that all this does not automatically mean that a state half the size of the previous one must automatically have a proportionately smaller diplomatic corps. It might mean either smaller or larger, but above all its distinguishing features will be efficiency and competence. That is why the new organization of the diplomatic network will take advantage of certain experiences of others, above all of countries of approximately the same size and geostrategic position, such as Holland, Hungary, or Greece.

In any case, there have to be fewer people working in the diplomatic service of a country with 11.5 million inhabitants. The network of embassies will be planned according to priority needs, they will have smaller staffs, but much higher demands will be put on them. Instead of large staffs, computers will be installed in the embassies, and at some jobs they will be very good replacements for personnel.

The time that an ambassador may spend in a country will not be limited, because our top diplomats will be constantly tested, and performance alone will determine when a replacement is sent to an embassy.

In the federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, this position is referred to as the "new aim in the diplomatic service" and "abandonment of certain of our erroneous conceptions" concerning mandatory determination of the entire tour for which an ambassador is sent to some country, regardless of his performance.

"It is more advantageous for the country for an able man to spend the major part of his career outside, rather than for us to bring back an able man because the time stated in advance has expired so that he can give up the ambassadorial post to the one whose 'turn has come,'" they explain in the federal MIP.

Aside from professionalism, our future ambassadors will have to be stable individuals who in their past work have unambiguously confirmed their readiness to place their knowledge at the service of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There will be no compromises concerning patriotism, that is, defending the national interest of the FRY.

"FRY citizenship, that is, citizenship of Serbia or Montenegro at the present, because the federal law on citizenship has not yet been adopted, has even up to now been a formal prerequisite for work in the diplomatic service. The condition, then, will not be nationality, but only citizenship," they say in the federal MIP. Although the policy of regional quotas in the new organization of the diplomatic service has been abandoned in principle, representation will be sought from both republics.

The restrictions are coming down not only on the embassies, but also on our consular missions. Many have already been closed or will be, and instead of permanent consular representatives, honorary consuls will serve as needed and occasionally to represent us in the world. They will be chosen among our distinguished emigres or proven friends of Yugoslavia. And there are still very many such people.

[Box, p 9]

Staff Size Cut in Half

The number of diplomatic staff members within the country and abroad has been dropping seriously since 1989, but particularly in recent months.

In 1989, the job analysis called for 2,392 positions, and they have decreased every year, so that according to the proposal of the new job analysis that will be adopted this May in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs there should be 1,302 employees, 683 of them within the country and 619 in diplomatic and consular missions of our country abroad.

According to the figures, on 9 June the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs employed a total 1,658, 995 of them within the country and 660 abroad, which is more than called for by the job analysis, but by yesterday their number had fallen to 1,303. According to the figures announced yesterday, the number of diplomatic and consular missions has also been reduced from 135 at the beginning of the year to 99 as of yesterday.

Even that job analysis and organization of the diplomatic service, however, was short-lived, because the federal government adopted a Decree on Formation of Federal Ministries, Other Federal Bodies, and Federal Organizations, which took effect last Saturday. Under it, as we have already written, all federal employees, including ambassadors and consuls and other diplomatic employees, are on waiting status, unassigned or assigned temporarily—until adoption of the new job analysis. From what they say in the federal MIP, there is every prospect that many fewer people than were planned even a month or two ago will be working in the future organization of the diplomatic service.

Serbia

DSS Leader Comments on Party Registration Ban

92BA1336C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Aug 92 p 11

[Article including interview with Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, by Miroslav Mikuljanac in Belgrade; date not given: "Justice From a Newspaper Article"]

[Text] A few days ago the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Serbia refused to register the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] on grounds that this could cause confusion in the citizenry, because the Democratic Party [DS], already registered, is frequently referred to in the media by precisely that name—the Democratic Party of Serbia. The fact that the contested new party is a very influential political and parliamentary force and that the issue of its not being registered is very sensitive (immediately in advance of talks about the roundtable and the new elections) was also the occasion for us to talk about the Democratic Party of Serbia with its president Vojislav Kostunica, people's deputy.

After separation from the Democratic Party, the DSS has undoubtedly been operating under difficult organizational conditions. All the property and office space remained with the Democratic Party. The headquarters of the DSS has necessarily been a lawyer's office in the Astoria Hotel, and it was in the hall there that we conducted the interview with the president of the DSS.

It Is a Ban

[Mikuljanac] What is your comment on the decision of the Serbian Ministry of Justice?

[Kostunica] The decision rejecting registration of the DSS is obviously unlawful and biased. It actually represents a ban on the operation of a political party, one of the strongest opposition parties, and that at a moment when we are about to establish the conditions under which the opposition would participate in the upcoming elections. Almost every election campaign in Serbia begins with something that essentially jeopardizes the possibility of the elections being equal and free and this act by the government of Serbia, that is, by its justice minister, only confirms that rule.

The decision itself is unlawful because the Law on Political Organizations, dating from 1990, provides that entry in the register can be refused only to those parties which have the same name as some party already registered. Cetkovic, the justice minister, asserts in the decision which he signed that it is not a question here of the same names, but of similar names, and thus he is using something that is not an integral part of the law. That is, in that decision he refers more to newspaper reports than to the law itself, because he says that because of newspaper articles in which the Democratic Party allegedly is referred to very frequently as the Democratic Party of Serbia, there could be confusion. The decision, then, is not based on the law, but on his reading of newspaper articles.

This also raises the question of the Justice Ministry's attitude toward the Democratic Party. In a way, the basis for refusing to register the DSS is a kind of protection which that ministry is openly offering to the Democratic Party. To make the thing still more paradoxical, it is not protecting the Democratic Party from other parties with a similar name, there are at least 10 of them, but only from the Democratic Party of Serbia.

The consequences that could come from this kind of decision are impediments of all the talks at the roundtable in Serbia and the federation, because many opposition parties have already expressed disagreement with this kind of arbitrary decision of the Justice Ministry. I would also recall that the federal justice minister, Tabor Barada, has already reacted to this decision, expressing amazement at its content, and these are all factors which will place Minister Cetkovic in an unpleasant position. We face a political decision whose consequences were

not reflected on. The DSS will use all political means in contesting this decision, because the issue itself does not stay within the limits of procedure as defined by law.

[Mikuljanac] A complaint before the Supreme Court of Serbia has been announced. Will that be withdrawn, or will the legal and political battles be conducted side by side?

[Kostunica] At this point, we will first of all take the political grounds into account. It is a fact that in a few days two talks are to be held at which the subject of the roundtable discussion related to the republic and federal elections might possibly be established. That is the first, but not the last occasion in which we will give immense publicity to this unlawful decision of the Justice Ministry. We will also be fighting in every other way. I think that our democratic public and also the foreign public will be very interested to see how the regime in Serbia and indeed even Yugoslavia, whose statements are distinguished by handsome words and promises, are able to justify this flagrant violation as the introduction to some possible democratic elections.

You have to realize that in politics individual cases very often cause far greater reactions than might have been foreseen at the beginning. Minister Cetkovic is at the moment treating all this as an internal matter, the issue of registering or not registering a party and of the relationship with another party which is already registered. At this point, he obviously is not in a position to foresee all the consequences of a decision like this.

The Danger of a New Socialism

[Mikuljanac] Do you believe that the issue will be resolved so that it will be possible to take part in possible elections?

[Kostunica] I believe that it will be resolved, because, as many times up to now, a dispute has arisen, one which is not only the dispute of one party and one government body, but a far-reaching problem that concerns democracy in Serbia, equality in the elections, and it will involve more or less all the democratic parties in Serbia, because this is an issue of general importance to the democratic public in Serbia.

[Mikuljanac] What would be your comment on the fact that registration of your party was simultaneously contested by the incumbent party, the Democratic Party, and the Serbian Radical Party?

[Kostunica] That question of the consent and identity of interests of these three parties is something that we have yet to highlight and explain. I have already said on one occasion that the DSS does not want to be Seselj in a tuxedo. That means that the incumbent party can operate by relying on two different types of collaborating satellite parties: those that represent semiterrorist organizations and are thus also operating against the opposition, and those which have been showing an incredible degree of consideration to the incumbent party and very little willingness to cooperate with other opposition parties.

I think that a new typology of political parties is being born before our eyes, one which arises from the nature of the regime which has existed here for 50 years and which has resulted in the shaping of a very corrupt political consciousness, political culture, and mode of political behavior. It has also generated the phenomenon of political parties which are opposition in their name and programs, but in their essence and activity are not. They represent a wall between the government and the opposition in Serbia, a fortress protecting the government. It is up to the Democratic Party to choose whether to accept that role all the way (trying to be a substitute for the Socialist Party of Serbia and to take away its voters) or it will operate as a party that is democratic in its principles. When we speak about principles, we must bear in mind that Serbia needs democracy very much after several decades of socialism. Here Stalin's socialism was replaced by Broz', then by the socialism of Draza Markovic and Ivan Stambolic, and then came the socialism of Slobodan Milosevic. There is a danger now that given the activity of the Democratic Party and under the patronage of Dobrica Cosic a new hybrid regime will once again be established instead of a pure democratic regime, yet another version of socialism, and that the Socialist Democratic Party is now emerging as the heir of the Socialist Party of Serbia, which replaced the League of Communists. This is something we do not need, because after several decades of lagging in democratic development, we need a pure democratic order, pure democratic institutions in keeping with customary democratic standards in the world.

[Box, p 11]

No Change of Name

Changing the name of the party is out of the question. Our name, the Democratic Party of Serbia, is not accidental, and it was not chosen so that we would differ only a little from the Democratic Party. There are many reasons why we are sticking to that name and why we will not give it up. With the first part of the name (the Democratic Party) we recall a tradition which we held with from its very founding in 1989, and that is the tradition of the old Democratic Party that emerged back at the beginning of this century. The other part of the name (of Serbia) points up the fact that the main democratic changes can and must occur in Serbia and that Serbia is the region whose democratization can bring about other relations in the Serbian-Montenegrin federation and which can also place the Serbs outside Serbia in a different relationship. Political and cultural unity of Serbs on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which is one of the basic goals of the DSS, can be achieved, gradually, of course, provided Serbia becomes a strong democratic state, and that explains the name of the Democratic Party of Serbia. The name "Democratic Party of Serbia" arises from the program, and to

renounce it would be to renounce the program as well. That is why there is no compromise over this issue.

[Box, p 11]

We Will Offer a Draft Constitution

"The Democratic Party of Serbia will soon present a new draft of the constitution, which is being done by a group of young historians. Our intention has been to contribute to the effort on behalf of a constitutional assembly on this occasion by presenting a constructive version of a constitution as we see it.

"By contrast with past partial proposals, this is a draft constitution in the true sense of the word and in the way that various political parties formerly submitted their own draft constitutions both in the last century and at the time of adoption of the Saint Vitus' Day Constitution. That draft would represent a link between the democratic tradition in Serbia and the highest achievements of present-day constitutionality, and it should be ready by the time of our election assembly in late September."

Metal Industries Affected by UN Sanctions

92BA1357A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 92 pp 13-14

[Article by S. Pejovic: "Steel Industry: Survival Time"]

[Text] The statistical service no longer publishes production figures by industry. However, this does not mean that one cannot learn anything about this. Milan Nikolic, president of the Independent Trade Unions of Serbian Metalworkers, has revealed, for example, that between 120,000 and 150,000 people are presently going to work in the entire metal sector, which is a third or even less of the total number employed. Nikolic explained the fair-sized margin for error in the estimate itself by saying that it is no longer possible to monitor precisely even which plants and mills are operating and which are shut down. After several weeks of forced vacation, the workers come on an agreed day for the management to announce to them that there still is no work. The president of the independent trade unions says that people are not rebelling, that the managers are the last ones they blame for the situation, adding that the almost complete shutdown of production activity in the metal-manufacturing sectors is not a direct consequence of the UN sanctions. Not yet, that is. Because the plants and mills would have shut down anyway because of the disintegration of Yugoslav economic space. Nikolic illustrates this assertion with examples from the factory where he is employed. Engine cylinder heads and all light alloys were being supplied by partners outside the territory of the newest Yugoslavia, and those deliveries were halted long ago. He works in a factory making automobile engines.

There is a big question, however, whether even that third who are now going to work have an adequate production output. According to what the trade associations have been able to learn, production in the metal-manufacturing industry of the third Yugoslavia dropped off 25 percent in the first half of the year as compared to the first half of last year. And even last year was a very bad year. This can best be seen in terms of the consumption of steel, that is, the principal material used in this sector's production. Over the period from 1979 to 1989, steel consumption on the space of the former Yugoslavia never dropped below 4.2 million metric tons, and in 1986, the record year, it was 4.9 million. Last year, however, again in the former Yugoslavia, it dropped to 2.4 million tons. So, it has practically been cut in half from that prolific year that is not so far back. Accordingly, when the numbers reported by the trade union leader of metalworkers and the estimates of the trade associations are combined, we easily conclude that the metal-manufacturing sector is operating with a fourth of the capacity used just two or three years ago. Moreover, all the workers are by and large still on the payroll, and Nikolic says that his factory (DMB) must even now send the next payroll to the government foundation established for that purpose. It is hard to say how the government will scrape together those payments. Especially if the new governor of the National Bank really exercises the right not to print money on order from any government.

As a matter of fact, it is not difficult at all to foresee that the sectors of metal production and manufacturing (and they represent more than a third of total industry) will very soon close their gates entirely. The severity of the UN sanctions will be manifested most quickly in those sectors, perhaps more dramatically than in the oil industry. That is, factories in these sectors are very firmly tied in their technology and production program to factories in the new states from the former unified Yugoslav space. Those ties must be renewed or replaced with others either within the framework of the smaller Yugoslavia or with foreign firms, assuming, of course, that the sanctions are lifted and the preconditions brought about in the country for revival of production, but also for investment.

Present assessments are that the question of removal of the sanctions will not even be raised before the end of this year. The enterprises themselves take that option for granted, which means that they look upon the remaining months of this year as a time for mere survival. After all, a dead enterprise will be a dead enterprise. Only those who survive will be able to reflect and try to reenter production and international trade. And the situation on the international market is not rosy at all. Aside from the forecasts, world steel production and consumption have been dropping for three straight years now. It is not just the former communist countries that are threatened, with production and sales dropping several dozen percentage points a year, but also the countries of the European Community, in which there has been a decline following a certain revival early this year. An improvement in the steel market has been noted only in the United States of America. The Japanese steel industry

has encountered significant problems on its own market, which could result in pressure on other markets. That automatically would result in a strengthening of protectionist measures in certain countries or regions. Yugoslav enterprises will have to honor all of these circumstances when they are in the situation once again to trade and work with the world.

Kosovo

Protests Reported After Serbian School Closures

LD0209113392 Tirana ATA in English 1030 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Text] Tirana, September 2 (ATA)—The co-worker of the ALBANIAN TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY in Pristina reports:

Large police forces and other Serb organs in Kosova [Kosovo] did not let Albanian pupils and teachers enter the secondary schools. It so happened in some elementary schools of communes as in Pristina, Fushe Kosova, Peja, Mitrovica, Istog, etc. The Pristina secondary school pupils, evicted by police from schools, poured out in the streets and squares of the capital of the Republic of Kosova, but controlled themselves and were calm in expressing their revolt .

In Peja and other regions of Kosova, there were multiplied police forces far and wide [in] the city. The Serb police pursued pupils who in order to prevent maltreatment and possible conflicts took to narrow streets and were hidden in houses. In Gjakova too Albanian secondary school children were not allowed to start classes before 8 o'clock, when pupils en masses have left for their schools, some reservists of the Serb Army threatening the Albanian school pupils shot in the air .

It is reported that on September 8 more than 400 thousand pupils and teachers gathered in front of over 900 schools to begin the new school year and to ask calmly to enter the schools which are closed by the Serb police for a year now.

Minister Comments on Ban on Albanian Education

AU0209161692 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 2 Sep 92 p 2

["i.m."/TANJUG report: "The Schools in Kosovo Are Going Underground"]

[Text] Vienna/Belgrade—Yesterday was the first day of school in Kosovo. Thus, for 500,000 Albanians—from the school beginner to the university professor—a school year begins, full of wretchedness, illegality, and fear. Muhamet Bicaj, education minister of the—self-proclaimed—Albanian Republic of Kosovo, who lives in exile in Slovenia, stated at a news conference in Vienna on 1 September that the Serbian-ruled province is Europe's youngest country and one-third of its population—pupils, students, or teachers—goes to school. Most of this school education must be conducted illegally, however, since the Albanians insist on their human right to schooling in their own language.

Serbian Education Minister Damilo Markovic also made it clear in Kosovo's capital, Pristina: Education in Kosovo "is only possible in accordance with the present legal situation;" only those who recognize Serbia and its syllabuses can go to school. Those who try to follow illegal Albanian curricula are excluded from it, he said.

Bicaj said that about three-quarters of the elementary school buildings, above all in rural areas, may be used by Albanians, but the teachers are not paid and the schools do not receive any financial support. The remaining quarter have been confiscated and are being used for classes in the Serbian language for non-Albanian pupils, who account for a little less than 12 percent; other schools have been converted into barracks, as in Kosovo Polje and Mitrovica, he said.

The secondary schools (which correspond to our upper grades), the University of Pristina, and the six provincial institutions are completely in the Serbs' hands. Here the alternative Albanian educational system is completely underground. To push through their coercive Serbianization, the authorities have not only prohibited the Albanian curricula, which the children of Kosovo had followed for years, but have also arrested university professors and school principals and shot demonstrating parents, he said.

At present, 100 Albanian school principals are in prison and 500 are living under strict police surveillance. Last month, the principal Hakipavata], who had wanted to use an empty school building for lessons in Albanian, died in prison following torture, he said.

Before the streamlining of the educational system in Kosovo last year, there had also been Turkish schools and some classes for Romany Gypsies, but these have also been closed now, in addition to Albanian and Serbo-Croatian schools. There also used to be a television program for Gypsies in their mother tongue, he said.

Montenegro

Police Chief Discusses Disarming Pljevlja Citizens

92BA1336D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Aug 92 p 14

[Interview with Milan Paunovic, head of the Internal Affairs Ministry Police Administration and head of the operational headquarters for disarmament in Pljevlja, by Zoran Saponjic; place and date not given: "No Disarmament Can Take Place Overnight"]

[Text] Last week paramilitary formations openly threw the gauntlet in the face of the Montenegrin and Pljevlja authorities after a long game of concealment in the form of the dramatic events in the north of Montenegro. The state's response followed immediately when it advanced new military and police forces and equipment. Pljevlja at the moment is in a kind of stalemate, awaiting the beginning and the first results of the disarmament drive. At the same time, there is ever greater pressure that everything must go forward peacefully, because many people here judge that if just one life is lost, there could be a great disaster and war throughout Montenegro.

Milan Paunovic, chief of the Police Administration of the Montenegrin MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], as of a few days ago also heads the operational headquarters whose main obligation is to disarm the paramilitary formations and restore peace to Pljevlja. The 30-year-old Paunovic says himself that this is "the most difficult task he has had in his life."

[Saponjic] Is it possible to carry out a disarmament campaign in this area, and if so how, and what technical problems do your people face?

[Paunovic] The armament of the citizens of Pljevlja, in my judgment, took place over a relatively lengthy period of time. I believe that the armament process was most intense during the beginning and course of the war in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]. We have to admit that groups and individuals were armed at that time, especially because many armies crossed the territory of this opstina before the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] was formed. I think, and I mean this very sincerely, that the political views of the highest bodies of government of the SFRY at the beginning of this war concerning possible new borders of the remainder of Yugoslavia contributed to the problematical nature of the overall situation and to the armament of the citizens. The complicated security situation in this opstina is characterized by a chill in interethnic relations, especially because some citizens of Serb, Montenegrin, and Muslim nationality are returning to Pljevlja with pronounced intolerance, indeed even enmity, especially if they have lost a family member on the battlefield.

It should be borne in mind that the dirtiest kind of interethnic and religious war is being waged in B-H, a war which itself has no rules. That is, the arming of citizens took place over a relatively lengthy period of time, and we should not expect the disarmament to take place overnight. No spectacular results should be anticipated in that sense. We should also bear in mind another dimension of this extremely complicated question. I believe that by and large all citizens of Pljevlja would welcome disarmament if it can take place without tragic consequences.

The most important thing at this moment is for us to prevent the abuse of weapons, the bearing and firing of arms, and the disarmament will above all be carried out on an individual basis, not frontally. I will give a drastic example of the abuse of firearms: a few days ago, the arrival of armed persons and the cocking of weapons against policemen. Opening fire would have meant a tragedy because there were about 100 citizens in the line of fire in the immediate vicinity. Wisdom lies in preserving people's lives.

[Saponjic] What kind of paramilitary units are involved in this case? Have they taken on organized forms in Pljevlja, and does your department have information on the types and quantities of armament they possess?

[Paunovic] It is the position of the FRY and of the Republic of Montenegro that in this state there should and must be one army and one police force. It is interesting that by and large all the armed groups and individuals stress that they are not paramilitary. If that is so, let them store up their weapons with the army or police. It is quite certain they will get them as soon as needed if we ever need them. Let this be an official call for them to give up their weapons, and all of this is aimed at our solving this problem. The department also possesses information on the types of firearms possessed illegally, and I will also say we have information on the approximate number of weapons they have.

[Saponjic] What is the state of your knowledge about the channels by which weapons reach this area and are there already lists of people who possess weapons illegally?

[Paunovic] I would not like to talk about those channels on this occasion. We do have approximate lists of people who possess weapons illegally, but certainly the information is not complete.

[Saponjic] In view of what happened in Pljevlja last weekend and the level of organization and armament of the people who blocked off the town, could there be extensive conflicts here if you used force?

[Paunovic] This is a job—a mission with many risks. We are aware of our accountability for the possible consequences. I believe that the armed citizens are also equally aware of a part of the responsibility. We will do everything to prevent tragic consequences from occurring.

[Saponjic] Is it possible that the people who a few days ago opposed the authorities with weapons will be aided by armed formations from the SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Hercegovina, because they have very close relations and frequent visits back and forth?

[Paunovic] I do not know what it would take for "our" armed groups to request aid from outside. The members of the police and Army of FR Yugoslavia have taken and are taking steps to secure the border line and also to achieve depthwise control of the territory. We think that the additional commitment of the MUP of the Republic of Montenegro, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, and the Army of Yugoslavia have achieved the necessary regime for security of the national border. I emphasize here the particular help and joint task of units of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the

Montenegrin MUP as a contribution to official establishment of the newly created state.

[Saponjic] What is your comment on the recent gatherings of citizens of Pljevlja and their opposition to the authorities?

[Paunovic] The immediate occasion for the gatherings and escalation into unrest on a broad scale, according to many of those present, was the announced differentiation in this security center. I respect the resentment expressed by the personnel of the center and members of their families, but they should all be aware that this is a matter being resolved within that center. Why give anyone an occasion to use this as an excuse for carrying out activities that could grow into interethnic conflicts on a broad scale? I would like to believe that there were not other intentions, but I would not say that it was all like that. I am commenting on those slogans such as the readiness and determination of the personnel of that center to remain working in this town.

[Saponjic] What was the purpose of the differentiation that was initiated in the Pljevlja Security Center, and will it be continued?

[Paunovic] The differentiation in the security center, and for that matter in the ministry as a whole, which takes the form of examining the performance and results of each individual, is a regular obligation of all organizational units of the MUP. Let us solve problems on our own in our own house.

[Saponjic] In view of how complicated the situation is, is it possible to preserve peace in Pljevlja, and do you expect any help from the citizenry?

[Paunovic] I believe that the citizens of Pljevlja want peace, the war in B-H has provided us with enough warning. All that being the case, we presumably are carrying out a joint mission.

[Box, p 14]

Armament by Parties

[Saponjic] Has there been "armament by parties" here?

[Paunovic] It is a fact that some of the armed people in this area belong to a party. Of course, at this moment I am not in a situation to provide an answer to that question. For that matter, the procedure is the same regardless of whether they are paramilitary units or armed party groups; that is, this is unlawful activity.

[Box, p 14]

Voluntary Return of Weapons?

[Saponjic] Do you think that a public appeal for voluntary return of weapons could yield any results in view of the recent events in Pljevlja?

[Paunovic] To be honest, I do not expect major results. But I do believe there are sensible people, and there will be such cases. I would be happy if together we should record such an action, the gesture of individuals and, I hope, of groups.

[Box, p 14]

Confiscated Weapons

Let us not forget that there is peace in Montenegro and that this is a very delicate task for members of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs. Confiscating illegal weapons is our constant task, and just in the first six months of this year we have confiscated from individuals 274 automatic rifles, 94 semiautomatics, 15 submachine guns, 23 automatics, 328 pistols and revolvers, 412 bombs, 10,000 rounds of ammunition, and four rifles with telescopic sights. In the last 10 days, since, that is, the decision of the Supreme Defense Council of the FRY, we have confiscated from members of paramilitary formations in Montenegro 20 automatic rifles, two semiautomatics, one submachine gun, 37 bombs, one two-way radio, seven pistols, and 1,066 rounds of ammunition.

Macedonia

Government Crisis Continues; Assembly in Session

AU0209164792 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Djordjioski report from Skopje]

[Text] There has been a debate going on for several hours now in the Assembly on whether one single issue—the election of the new Macedonian government—is going to appear on the agenda at all. The situation, one would say, is rather confusing and vague. The old government was given a vote of no-confidence two months ago.

First, the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] was given a mandate to form a new government, but then it abandoned the mandate because it was unable to secure a parliamentary majority.

After that, the chance was given to Social Democrat Petar Gosev. He, too, abandoned the mandate, so Gligorov, president of the republic, then again, for the second time, gave the mandate to the same party, and Branko Trajkovski formed the future government.

The VMRO, however, does not want to enter a coalition now, and opposes such a government. VMRO believes that Gligorov broke the constitutional law of this republic by giving the mandate twice to the same party, to which he himself belongs—the former communists. The fact that Albanians are in the new government as ministers indicates that it is a matter of a communist-Albanian government. MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action] regards them as a government of a communist-feudal type.

VMRO thinks that Gligorov wants to secure neo-communism in Macedonia, and turn it into a world of darkness. Ultra-left communists and ultra-right Albanians formed the new government, with Lazar Klisevski participating as well. Then a coup was carried out in the Social Democrat Party, and the attempt at disqualifying Vasil Tupurkovski came to light.

VMRO is criticizing Gligorov and the Social Democrats, and proposing a VMRO government of national salvation which will prepare new elections. It also identifies itself with such a government.

But all the speakers today agree on one thing: The Macedonian people are suffering. They have been almost totally impoverished, and chaos is in sight. A danger of unrest and disorder is expected, as the situation has become almost unbearable. The wave of strikes is on the upsurge. Simply put, the deputies' dilemma in the Assembly is whether a government should be elected which will at least try to start straightening out the situation in the republic, or should they just give in to chaos until new elections are called.

There is not much use for the old government, which is still current, even though it has resigned. It is no longer interested in events in the republic, and is indignantly behaving like a scorned mistress that sees revenge only in the continuing of the mayhem in this republic.